

In nearly every musical composition we seem to hear strains which we think we heard before; so, in new poems, we fancy there are welcome reminiscences of earlier pleasure. In *Songs in the Night* we hear Wordsworth, with musical recurrence; and Christina Rossetti and dearly beloved Adelaide Procter. This makes the verse, if dear at all, so much the dearer; and thus we commend *Songs in the Night* for that deliciousness of charm which gives us a new and lovely companion, in addition to others hitherto and forever dear, and all congenial.

CAN THE IMMATERIALITY, SPIRITUALITY, AND
IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL
BE DEMONSTRATED?

Body and Mind. By Henry Maudsley, M.D., London. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

Primeval Man. By the Duke of Argyll. New York: George Routledge & Sons. 1874.

THE proof that the human soul is immaterial, spiritual, and immortal, seemed, even to some Christian philosophers of preceding centuries, to be a difficult task. Duns Scotus held the opinion that neither the mortality nor the immortality of man's soul can be conclusively proved by unaided reason. Other Christian philosophers, with Jandunus, Peter Pomponatius, and Simon Portius, maintained that according to philosophy and natural reason, the human soul is mortal; but according to faith it is immortal. Many understand Aristotle as wavering in his judgment of this matter; while others, with the schoolmen, explain his words as unequivocally declaring for the spirituality and immortality of man's soul. There is a numerous class of physicists at the present day, who, with Tyndall, hold that "in matter we have the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," and, by consequence, matter is in itself capable of intellectual life. Locke maintained that it is not intrinsically impossible for matter to think; on this account he denies that the immateriality of the soul can be demonstrated by natural reason, "for the state we are at present in, not

being that of vision, we must, in many things, content ourselves with faith and probability; and in the present question, about the immateriality of the soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty we need not think it strange. . . . It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge."¹ Herbert Spencer, Mill, and other English writers on science, with a numerous school of German philosophers, simply remit this question concerning the spiritual nature of the soul, to the category of the unknowable; a dark abyss into which every subject pertaining to spiritual and personal natures is sent by them, summarily and without the benefit of a fair hearing. Finally, there are they who look upon the question concerning the nature of the human soul as still unsettled, and they expect the physiologist and biologist to decide it; for they deem it an inquiry which it is for this class of physicists to answer. The Duke of Argyll denies that this dispute belongs to the sphere of physiology: "The fundamental error of the phrenological school lay in the idea that a science of mind can be founded in any shape or form upon the discoveries of anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that physiology can ever be the basis of psychology; and this is an error and a confusion of thought which survives phrenology."²

No doubt the science of physiology and the philosophy of the human soul may mutually benefit each other, at least, indirectly; but the physiologist can never, purely by the principles of his own science, prove either that man's soul is spiritual, or that it is not

¹ Essay concerning Human Understanding; Book iv., ch. 3.

² Reign of Law, chapter vi. By the Duke of Argyll. George Routledge & Sons, New York, 1874. This work is, under several respects, worthy of high commendation; it is an able contribution to a kind of learning now much needed. In regard to Darwin's genesis of species, he maintains the following theses: "It cannot be too often repeated that Natural Selection can produce nothing whatever except the conservation or preservation of some variation *otherwise originated*. The true origin of species does not consist in the adjustments which help varieties to live and to prevail, but in those previous adjustments which cause those varieties to be born at all." It is undeniable that all Darwin's multitude of facts really bear on the preservation or growth, not the first origin of species. Argyll's theory for explaining and defending the freedom of the human will is, perhaps, susceptible of being ultimately reduced to that of the "præmotio physica;" his reasoning would be more clear had he distinguished precisely between the will's necessitated action, the principle of which is intrinsic to the will, and its forced action, whose principle, if such action be possible, would be extrinsic to the will. Necessitated action of the will is voluntary, or, it is spontaneous though not free action; but forced action would not be the will's action; it would be passion, or action suffered by it. To say that the will is free when it is *determined* by the motive, is certainly a confusion of language. It is true that the will cannot choose without a motive as the object of its choice; but the choice itself, *qua* choice, must be the act of the will alone; otherwise such action is not different from that of the merely physical or natural agent, which is not free but necessary action, as *v. g.*, the fire's burning, the eye's seeing, etc. The motive is a prerequisite condition for choice, but it does not determine the choice that is free; it is the will that determines such choice.

spiritual, any more than could the soothsayer of old veritably read the future doom of a nation in the entrails of birds. Some physiologists, who see that their science gives no direct demonstrative proof for or against the existence of man's spiritual nature, classify the subject with metaphysical and fanciful matters that are unknowable, which is a false assumption, whether we consider their assertion as related to science or to the legitimate art of reasoning.

Among the scholastic philosophers it was generally held that the immateriality, spirituality, and immortality of the human soul, can be truly and validly demonstrated by natural reason; and they agreed among themselves as to the particular main arguments which conclusively prove these truths. Making abstraction of supernatural revelation then, what conclusive reason can be given in proof that man's rational soul is immaterial, and capable of existing disembodied, and, by consequence, that it is spiritual?

Before proposing an answer to this question, the precise meaning here given to the terms, "immaterial, spiritual," should be defined and explained. The term, "immaterial," is applied to two kinds of spiritual nature and substance, 1st, to that spiritual nature or being which, besides having no property possessed by matter, cannot naturally be united with matter, so as by that union to form with it one compound substance: of such a nature every pure spirit, as *v. g.*, the angel, is believed to be; 2d, the term, "immaterial," is also applied to that spiritual nature or substance which, although it continues to exist and act when its union with the body has ceased, yet, by its nature, it is both fitted and ordained to union in composition with the body; such is the human soul, as we shall see. A thing is not really "immaterial," then, according to the sense in which the term is here used, unless it can exist independently of matter, that is, when not actually in union with matter, whether as a substantial constituent or as an accident of body. Whatever can exist only as a property, quality, or accident of matter, and also, whatever can exist only as a constituent of material or corporeal substance, is itself something material; for, it pertains to material substance, and it naturally depends for its existence on that material substance. To this category we must refer all the qualities in matter which our senses can directly apprehend; all its properties that are chemical or dynamic. Ascending higher in the order of material action we find corporeal substance capable of life or vital operation; that it may possess vegetable and animal organism, with two very distinct grades of life along with their respective classes of action specifically different from each other. All the kinds of action here enumerated, including that of vegetable and animal life, are plainly seen to be the operation of corporeal substance. Even that school of physicists, who are so un-

philosophical as to reduce all action of every kind to that of one force, thus making too little advance on the generalizations reached by the simple mind that omits all consideration of second or intermediate causes, and refers every effect directly and proximately to God;¹ even the physicists referred to admit that the highest purely animal action does not transcend the order of material nature. Only that is immaterial, then, which has no common predicate with matter, or which has no real property that matter has, and which, by its own nature, can exist when totally separate from material or corporeal substance. Therefore, in order to prove the immateriality of the human soul, it is necessary to show that its properties, powers, and whole nature are of a totally distinct order of being from a thing that is material in its nature; and that though it informs matter, it can exist independently of matter. Observe, then, that "immaterial" does not here signify what is merely negative; it expresses something positive, and it denies that thing to be material. We concede to the materialist that what is styled the brute soul, *anima bruta*, having no action which transcends the power of corporeal substance, is itself of matter; for, it has none but sensible or organic action, and a sense or organ is material substance. The brute soul is styled material, also because, as will be made more manifest in another part of this article, it cannot exist except when united with matter, although it is, in itself, simple as a principle of life.

The word spirit, spiritual, is employed in several distinct senses, which need not be here enumerated and described, as breath or air, spirit of wine, animal spirit, etc.; but it must, in this place, be ascertained precisely what is meant by spirit, spiritual, when it is predicated of the human soul. *Spirit* may be sufficiently described for this purpose by affirming of it, 1st, it is a substance which is of a species that is totally different from that of matter, and it is superior to material substance; 2d, it is a substantial rational nature that can exist alone or separate from any other substance; it does not necessarily require another substantial principle to be united with it in order for it to be sustained in existence.

Some modern authors affirm that the spirituality of the human soul is proved by the simplicity of the soul: the soul is simple, therefore it is spiritual. This argument is, at the best, not satisfactory, is open to logical objection, and it was never employed by

¹ As the wise axiom expresses it, "bene docet, qui bene distinguit:" he alone teaches us well who distinguishes well. It may be good, and it is good, to show that the ten categories can be reduced to two, that of substance, and that of accident; but he alone philosophizes well for us who also distinguishes and explains the categories. So, it is of little profit to learn that all action may be reduced to that of force; the action and the kind of power in every nature beheld by us must have its distinctive operations defined and described.

the acute scholastic metaphysicians. Simplicity is opposed to composition,¹ as unity is opposed to multitude or many. The brute soul, considered in itself, is simple; the formal principle in the living vegetable is, in itself, simple; so every substantial formal principle is, in itself, simple, as is everything that has in itself unity, and is at the same time, not *per se* divisible. Hence, the simplicity of the soul does not prove the spirituality of the soul; man's soul is simple because it is a substantial formal principle; its spirituality arises, not from its simplicity, which is generic and is common to it and the brute soul, but from its being intelligent, immaterial as well as simple, and capable both of existing *per se* and acting *per se*. When the soul is shown to be a spiritual substance, then its simplicity as *forma hominis*, becomes proof of its natural immortality. To attribute to the word simplicity an interpreted and arbitrary meaning, according to which it is made to express the specific marks or notes only of complete spiritual substance, seems to be a forced use of the term, and the reasoning for the spirituality of the soul will then require, in order to escape fallacy, much artful trimming of words; which is wholly avoided in the direct and simple proofs given by the schoolmen. The brute soul is a simple substantial principle naturally ordained to union with the brute body: the human soul is also a simple substantial principle naturally ordained to union in composition with the human body. Let us now see whether there be really demonstrative proofs that the human soul is moreover a spiritual substance.

It would seem that no one clearly understanding the terms and scope of the principal argument for the immateriality of the soul, can fail to grant the conclusion as necessarily following. Anything whose action transcends the action of material or corporeal substance, is superior to corporeal substance or is immaterial; but there is in man something that has action which wholly transcends the action of any corporeal agent; by consequence there is in man something which is superior to material substance or is immaterial. If this argument be true, then there is in man a principle of action which is superior to any one of his corporeal principles of action, and it is on that account wholly or specifically different from all corporeal or material principle.

Though the rebuke given by the Duke of Argyll to those physiologists that assume the office of settling this question with the

¹ The following kinds of composition are usually named and described in works on general metaphysics. Composition 1st, of matter and form; 2d, of genus and difference; 3d, of integrant parts; 4th, essence and existence; 5th, nature and subsistence; 6th, subject and accidents; 7th, power and act. All components must ultimately be constituents that are in themselves simple; as to whether or not these ultimate elements can exist separate from the whole, depends, not on their simplicity or their being uncompounded, but on their having or not having the requisites of substantial nature.

forceps and microscope¹ be just, yet let us concede beforehand, to Maudsley, Huxley, Bain, etc., all the genuine conclusions which their inductive proofs have established; and that the phenomena of brain action, molecular nerve force, brain ideation, are facts faithfully described by them; all this, however, does not concern the present dispute, except in what is secondary and accidental; for, after all, the anatomy of the brain, with a minute and precise description of its organization, while of prime importance to physiology, is not essential to the present subject, unless in some secondary sense. All that the physiologist can discover and describe is a material organ, with its material parts or constituents; if he discovers more, it must be by the metaphysics, which, however, he forswears. The question here considered is, has man a something in his nature whose action transcends the action of any material organ, how perfect soever it may be? The answer is to be maintained, not against the mere physiologist, whose proper office is with organs and organic life; but rather against the physicist or the philosopher of physical nature, who affirms that it is physically possible for matter to think rationally.

A power which knows what is entirely abstract, *i. e.*, what is totally removed from matter, so as to have no real predicate in common with matter, cannot possibly be a power of material substance. A body can act only as body; its action is physical, material, and the object which such action reaches and really modifies is also a material object, for how can an agent go out of its entire sphere, and put action, the principle of which is not at all in its nature? Hence our Lord said, "Does any one gather grapes from thorns, figs from thistles?" It exceeds the natural power of thorns to produce grapes, and it is above the power of thistles to bear figs. To this it might be replied, "It transcends the natural power of thorns and thistles to remain within their species and to produce these fruits; but since the bearing of such fruit does not transcend the sphere of vegetable action, they could be made, by superadded virtue, miraculously to produce those fruits." This supposition appears to involve no contradiction or intrinsic impossibility. But for material substance or a body to know the purely abstract, the universal, the virtuous or morally good, would be for it to go entirely out of the whole order or species of material things to another order or species of things, having no one real note or

¹ Draper sees the truth enunciated by Argyll, but less clearly and precisely. "Though under the most enlarged acceptation, it would fall under the province of physiology to consider this immortal principle (the soul), and to consider its powers and responsibilities; these constitute a subject at once so boundless and so important, that the physiologist is constrained to surrender it to the psychologist and theologian." *Human Physiology*, Book i., ch. i. It is evident that he confounds the object of physiology with that of anthropology or the philosophy of man.

quality in common with it. It may be said that there are no two species of material substance in nature, which do not possess some or other common real qualities; but moral good, or the universal, has no real quality possessed by any material thing whatever. Matter must act materially; it cannot act immaterially, for this is a contradiction in terms. A body cannot remain a body, and understand the true; it may be informed with an intellectual spirit; it may be annihilated and replaced by an intelligent spirit; but it cannot as body be made capable of what is not done by a body, or what wholly transcends the species of bodily action, no more than a line on a spherical surface can at the same time be a line in a plane surface. It is in this meaning the well-known axiom of the schools is used: "Modus agendi sequitur modum essendi," the mode of acting follows the mode of being; or, the action is according to the nature or essence of the agent. A corporeal agent cannot act on what is wholly incorporeal, since that would be to have incorporeal action. It is not inconceivable that an agent whose perfection is superior in its species to that of matter should possess virtue or power great enough in its superior species to be capable of acting on matter; since the ability to do what is greater may include the ability to do what is less; but there is repugnance in supposing the action of any being wholly to exceed the limits of its species and power. The principal action of corporeal nature as known to us, is dynamic, chemical, vital, and animal; and the species which is highest of all is that of sensation, while the one which is lowest in species is the mechanical. It is not denied by the materialist that every sensible power is a material power, for every sense is an organ of the body, whether it be an external sense, or an internal sense seated in the brain; but what he does deny is the impossibility of matter's thinking intellectually, or he holds that it is possible for matter to think, and put all the acts of cognition which distinguish man from inert matter and the brute animal. We accept the concession, then, that all sensible cognition is the act of a material agent; for, in fact all sensible cognition has for its object, and its only object, sensible or material things apprehended in a material manner. Therefore, the sense which is a material organic power cannot apprehend or perceive what is wholly abstracted from matter and from every real quality of matter, as is the purely metaphysical, the universally true, the morally right, etc., for this order of being is totally separated from the material order, and a material agent acts materially or on material objects only.

Here a difficulty occurs which it is not easy to solve satisfactorily to all minds; but yet it does not impair the validity of the reasoning which we have advanced: if the material agent cannot transcend the entire material order of objects, in its action; and if the spiritual

intellect can come to know the material thing, but not without concurrent action of the material thing as object, then why say that the material agent cannot in its action go beyond the entire sphere of material objects, or that it cannot have an immaterial object of its action? The scholastic philosophers saw this difficulty, and they solved it by attributing to the spiritual intellect a supremacy of perfection, and a superiority of action by which it can descend to the internal sense, supplement its action, receive from it what the intellect can dematerialize, and thus elevate it to the intelligible order, or the intellectual order; they made this operation the office of the active intellect, or *intellectus agens*. It must be confessed that philosophers have never relieved this point of all its obscurity; but no one of them ever sought to relieve it of its difficulty by supposing that the intellectual idea was formed by the sense or organ. The difficult question is, how can the sensible image become an object of intellectual action, or be *objected* before the intellect in any manner? The question is not, how can a material organ form an intellectual idea, for that seems to assume what is absurd. Hence, since this difficulty regards only the manner in which a material thing can concur as an object in originating intellectual acts or ideas, it is beside the question discussed with materialists, can organized matter form for itself intellectual ideas, or can it think the purely abstract and metaphysical? Therefore, this difficulty concerning the origin in man's mind of ideas whose objects are material things apprehended by the sense, need not further impede the progress of our discussion; for no matter what theory be chosen among those proposed to explain this point, it still remains true that the sensible power or the organ does not form the intellectual idea; its office is to present the object.

Another objection will here naturally arise. Since all our knowledge takes its first origin from sensible things, and since it is conceded by all, that intellectual thought is not naturally possible to us without the fancy, which is admitted to be a merely organic or sensible power, not at all a purely spiritual power; hence the understanding, being something thus wholly dependent on the bodily senses, it cannot be anything really distinct from the powers of the body. In this objection the facts, it may be granted, are really as it states them; but the conclusion here drawn does not truly follow from these facts. The fancy or imagination is a sensible or organic faculty, which, perhaps without any doubt, is seated in the brain; it is also true that we cannot naturally think except dependently on that faculty for the objects of thought; and yet the intellect that does think, is not a sensible or bodily power, but it is, and it must be, a spiritual power, for the reasons already given, and for others still to be adduced. We may make a comparison which will serve

to illustrate by sensible things the manner in which the intellect is dependent on the fancy for its objects of thought, and thus help the mind clearly to conceive the nature of that dependence. For this purpose let us make the odd supposition that a man was so made as to be unable to see any visible object, unless as imaged in a mirror arranged before his eyes in such manner that from no point of the horizon, from no point above him, beside, or beneath his eyes, could any object be seen, except as imaged in that mirror; he can turn himself so that the mirror will reflect any object around him, but the object cannot transmit its light directly to his eye; in order to be seen by him, everything must be reflected to his eye by that mirror.

In this case the man could see no visible object at all, except dependently upon the mirror. In a similar manner is the human intellect completely dependent on the imagination or fancy for the presentation of all its objects of thought; if that mirror be veiled, as in deep sleep, the intellect sees nothing; if that mirror, or the fancy, which is an organic power in the brain, be diseased, its action is abnormal, and the mental operation is more or less insane, in proportion to the extent of the organic ailment. But yet the abstract idea which the intellect forms for itself, and by the medium of which it knows the object imaged in the fancy, is something wholly outside of the material order; it is the immaterial idea of a thing presented materially by the image in the fancy; it is immaterial, for, it is wholly abstract, and by consequence it has no real quality or real property of matter. Let us understand clearly what is meant by the proposition, "the idea in the intellect, *v. g.*, of a tree, is abstract, and it therefore has no real quality which the tree has." Examples will help to render this more easily intelligible: suppose the photograph likeness of a friend—this likeness has some resemblance to the person—but it excludes most of what is real in that person, retaining only a diminished outline figure filled up with some shading; yet this photograph has, as a material substance, many qualities common to it and the original, besides the figure. The image of the same photograph likeness formed on the retina of the eye is far more refined; and it excludes or omits much of what is gross matter in the photograph itself; still more refined and less grossly material is the image you will contemplate by closing the eyes, and beholding the same picture as reproduced and presented by the fancy. The photograph is, in a certain degree, abstract, as regards the original; the image on the retina of the eye is much more so; and still more abstract is the image in the fancy. Now, the idea as in the intellect, is wholly abstract, for it retains no real physical quality of the photograph, but is an image of a superior and totally distinct order, possessing even the capability of being applied

as a universal ; then how is it possible to conceive an abstract and universal idea that is produced by an agent which is purely material ?

It is manifest that the reasoning here advanced is *a posteriori*, or, it is argumentation from the effect or acts of the intellect to their cause. From the nature of the effects, we infer the nature of the cause ; and the more numerous and various the effects observed, the more fully is the character of their cause manifested to us. Having formed our idea of the cause, we describe it by both positive and negative predicates ; for example, we observe the different effects produced by oxygen and hydrogen. Inferring their nature from the effects witnessed by us, we affirm them to be gases ; that they combine in a uniform proportion, and constitute water ; that hydrogen will not support combustion ; that oxygen will not burn, but it will support combustion, etc. We here conclude to the nature or species of these objects from the effects produced by them : this is man's only method of learning truth empirically ; but proof by this method may be perfectly demonstrative, and therefore certain, as all logicians admit.

We have seen that the abstract and universal idea which is formed by the intellect, is an effect that exceeds all material effects, and that it must, therefore, be ascribed to the action of a cause which is of a specifically and totally different order of being. The same kind of reasoning may be applied to the will or rational appetite ; it can love and desire the morally good or virtuous ; it can love the absolutely true, as beautiful and good ; but this is action having no identity of property or quality with the action of any power in material substance ; therefore, the will is a faculty that belongs to an immaterial nature. Also, there is no assignable limit, whether of species or magnitude, to the objects towards which the intellect and will can tend, and which, in a certain proportion, even including God, they can attain or reach ; they attain or apprehend things specifically below themselves, in a manner superior to those things, for they attain to material things in an immaterial manner ; they reach even God, but in a manner proportioned to themselves and to their condition while the spirit is united with the body. We may say, then, that the object of their action is unbounded, is infinite. Now what power of material substance can be conceived, the object of whose action is thus unlimited, especially when we take into the account the undeniable principle that a material agent or nature cannot put immaterial action ?

We may validly conclude, therefore, that the human intellect and will are powers belonging to an immaterial nature, or that the subject of such powers cannot be corporeal substance. We know a being or agent only by its action, and the objects of its action ; how

else can we know anything of it? By the action of the agent or being we learn its powers, and from those powers we infer the nature or essence of that being; there is no other manner by which man can come to the knowledge of any real thing whatever.

It having been shown that the intellect and will in man cannot be powers of his body, because their action is immaterial, the proof that his soul is a spiritual substance may now be stated: the soul has action in the eliciting of which the body does not share; *i. e.*, the soul acts *per se*, or of itself; therefore it must be capable of existing *per se*, or substantially. The action of the intellect in knowing abstract truth or the universal, cannot be attributed to the body, or to any power of the body; it must therefore be the act of what is incorporeal, the act of another substance distinct from, superior to the body. In order to perceive the force of this reasoning, it is necessary to understand the precise meaning, and see the truth of the axiom, "what acts *per se*, or by its own virtue, also exists *per se*, or is a substance."¹ The intellect is, in itself, a power or faculty; as a faculty it must belong to some substance which is the subject in which it inheres. Now, since the intellect exists and acts dependently on the substance to which it belongs, we conclude that because its action is independent of the body, its subject must be in some manner independent of the body, and must be a substance. There is a something in man, then, which is intelligent and free, having action of its own in which the body does not share; then it has the essential properties of a substance, and can exist *per se*, or substantially. The human soul is therefore spiritual; for a spirit is an immaterial, intelligent substance; it is simple, because it is the formal principle in man, "*anima hominis est forma corporis*;" it is intrinsically active, because it is a living formal principle. If the foregoing doctrine be true, we may infer that the soul is not, so to say it, wholly immersed in the body, or its whole nature is not totally absorbed by the body; but some virtue of that nature is left apart from the corporeal substance, and therefore not constituting a something of the compound made by union of soul and body;² the intellect and will are not powers of the compound; they are powers of the soul alone. This seems reasonable and according to the very nature of things; for the soul is a substance which is greatly superior in its nature to material substance, and it is therefore not commensurate with matter; its perfection exceeds the whole capacity of matter to receive. Hence, some illustrate this union of soul and body, in which the entire entity of the soul does not go into that union, by the simple comparison of a man whose whole person ex-

¹ Quidquid per se operatur, et per se existit.

² St. Thomas, Summa, p. 1, qu. 76, a. 1, ad. 1.

cept his head is immersed in water ; analogously, the intellect and will are not merged in the compound of soul and body ; they remain out of it or apart from it.

The dependence of the intellect on the fancy is, as already noticed, only for the presentation of objects ; hence, the fancy is necessary for intellectual action only by way of *conditio sine qua non*, as your eye depends for seeing an object reflected in the mirror, on having a mirror before it ; as the mirror is something extrinsic to the eye's power of vision, so in an analogous degree, the fancy is something extrinsic to the intellect. This reasoning suggests the objection : " Since the intellect thus necessarily depends on the fancy for the presentation of its objects, it follows that the soul cannot exist when separated from the body ; for, in that separated condition, the intellect could not act, for the want of an object, and by consequence, all the powers of the soul would be in a dormant state ; but as this manner of existing, in the very nature of things, is not to happen, we may infer that the soul has no existence except dependently on its union with body, and it is therefore not a spiritual substance." In answer to this statement we must reason *a priori* : as the soul of man when in union with the body must act in a manner proportioned to that condition ; so, when it is separated from the body, it must naturally have a mode of action, of understanding, which is proportioned to that manner of existing ; this cannot be doubted, for the natures of things are all perfect in their species. Hence, as in the one state the understanding acts dependently for its objects of thought on the bodily organs, so, in the other, it must act independently of this extrinsic and instrumental assistance.

We have no positive ground to doubt that the human soul is by its very nature ordained to union with the body. It is on this account that the soul as separated from the body is not styled a person ; for a person is defined in philosophy to be an intelligent substance, which is under every aspect complete ; and since the separate soul postulates that union with the body, it is not under all respects a complete substance. It is a legitimate corollary from this reasoning, that even natural reason furnishes some proof of the body's resurrection.¹

We may infer from the arguments thus far advanced that, aside from the proofs of the soul's immortality which remain to be given, man's soul, having action of its own, in eliciting which the body is

¹ St. Th., p. 1, 2, qu. 4, a. 6, ad. 1, 2, 3, and p. 1, qu. 76, a. 1, ad. 6, where he says, " Anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata habens aptitudinem, et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem ;" the human soul keeps its own existence when separated from the body, possessing an aptitude for, and a natural inclination to, union with the body.

not a principle, is an immaterial substance, and it is capable of existing as a substance when it is separated from the body. Now as to its immortality: there are many reasons which prove with more or less of logical force the immortality of the soul; when all are taken together, they constitute complete demonstration, as even pagan philosophers admitted and maintained. We may here legitimately assume that the soul is the living principle in man; it is the principle in him to which we have attributed his highest living acts, those of intellect and will, and from it comes all vital action in man. Then, if this living soul dies or ceases to exist when separated from the body, either it must die by a law of its own nature, or else God must himself directly annihilate it; but it cannot actually happen through either one of these causes, and therefore it cannot happen at all.

To say that God has not the power to annihilate what He created, would be nonsense; but there are sufficient reasons on account of which He will not annihilate all His creatures; and hence it is sometimes said in this moral sense, God cannot annihilate spiritual natures. We cannot assign any end which would justify to reason the creation and the subsequent annihilation of an intelligent being; indeed, what valid reasons can we state which prove even that this earth, the planets and stars, should be annihilated? God's manifestation of himself *ad extra*, is perfectly accomplished only by the creation of intelligent beings destined in His designs and fitted by their nature to endure with unending life. These statements indicate the arguments by which it is shown to be irrational to suppose that an intelligent being can be created for annihilation.

As was already affirmed, the soul's natural immortality is proved by its simplicity and substantiality, or by its being a simple and living substance that can exist independently of matter. Since death is the separation of the living soul from the body informed by it, just as corruption is the dissolution of a compound whole into its constituent parts; only that substance can die, which consists of a body animated with a living principle; but man's soul when separated from the body continues to exist a living substance, no longer compounded with matter; therefore it cannot die. The brute soul dies with its body, because, though simple in itself, it has no action distinct from its corporeal and organic action, and by consequence, it has no existence as a substance distinct from its body. When the vegetable dies, its living principle perishes; when the brute animal dies, its formal principle, or the principle of life in it perishes; for that which can have no action can have no existence; and the brute soul, if conceived to be separated from its body, could have no action; for, it has no intellect nor other power except what it has through the organs of its body when it is actu-

ally informing that body. But man's soul besides informing his body, has powers superior to all organic and corporeal powers; it can therefore exist when apart from the body, and, being an uncompounded substance, it cannot suffer dissolution or die.

Again, man's soul both knows of, and it naturally desires, unending bliss; then he is fitted and ordained by his nature for a state of perpetual beatitude; therefore, either man's soul is immortal, or else he is created without an appointed ultimate destiny which is proportioned to his nature; but God creates nothing in vain, therefore man's soul is created immortal. We cannot conceive that any created nature should ever totally fail to reach or at all to fulfil the end for which its very essence is shaped, and which is obviously the final cause of its existence, and hence the axiom, "nunquam deficit natura in necessariis;" nature never fails or falls short of that for which it is necessarily ordained. Unless the capacity of man's intellect to know the good and true and beautiful, be in vain; unless the capacity of his will to desire longingly for perfect bliss be given to it in vain, then there is an object proportioned to those faculties of his nature, and that object necessarily supposes the immortality of his soul. We daily see the visible and passing things around us faithfully and exactly accomplishing the ends for which they are manifestly ordained by their nature, and by this we come to learn the most general and necessary law of everything's action.

Now there can, *a fortiori*, be no exception to this principle in natures of a superior order; therefore, since man's higher powers, his intellect and will, do not attain, in his mortal life on earth, an object proportioned to them, or commensurate with their capacity, his soul must be destined for a superior and immortal state.

That no object nor condition, attainable by man in this life, is adequate to the greatness of his powers and to the intrinsic dignity of his nature, is a truth that undeniable facts and principles render very evident. The most virtuous and meritorious life is passed, in numerous instances, either without any reward on earth, or, at least, without adequate or equitable reward; therefore the due reward of genuine virtue must pertain to a future state of existence. The quasi proverb, "virtue is its own reward," originated with the Stoic philosophers of old, and it is not really true in any but rare and exceptional cases; for, even when virtue brings to the good man some present recompense, it is never, at least in the case of difficult moral virtue, an adequate reward, as Lessius shows.¹ An action is not performed for its own sake, but on account of the end in respect to which that action is a means. The beauty and excellency of virtue cannot be duly appreciated by all, nor does its

¹ De Providentia Numinis et de Immortalitate Animæ, lib. ii., ratio 17a.

value proceed from these qualities principally or apart from all ulterior reason why virtue is good ; but it is the end to which virtue is ordained from which it derives its chief importance, just as the seed is not sown merely for the sake of that action, but for the fruit that the seed is to produce in the future.

The prophet Jeremias asks, "Why doth the way of the wicked prosper?"¹ and Job, "Why do the wicked live, are they advanced, and strengthened with riches?"² It is perhaps certain that the reason or argument which principally founds this conviction in the minds of all mankind of every nation, tribe, and tongue, namely, man will have a state of life succeeding his present life ; the principal reason which leads mankind to this conclusion is the fact that it is the obvious explanation, and it is at the same time the only consistent explanation of man's present condition in this world. Their idea of the future state is more or less perfect, more or less rude and obscure ; but yet every race of mankind infers from man's nature and from the present order of things as understood by them, that man has another life beyond the grave. How can that conclusion be false, which all mankind agree in drawing from the same substantial facts ? All feel the same strong desire, the same unsatisfied yearning for a future and better state of existence ; how can this inclination of man's rational nature be thus universal to the families of the human race, and yet have no corresponding end or object intended to be attained by it ? How can there be a nature that is brought into existence without a befitting end or aim, and thus prove an essential and manifest flaw in the very design of creation ?

That the spirituality and immortality of the human soul are believed as a dogma of the Christian religion, need not be here proved, nor is it denied by the materialists, though they deny both the immateriality of the soul and the fact of revelation. There are other cogent arguments from reason in proof of the soul's spirituality and immortality, which, however, cannot be stated and developed within the limits to which this article must be confined. Let us now briefly consider the theory of the materialistic school, and examine some principal reasons which they allege in proof of their hypothesis.

There are, indeed, several classes of materialists, differing more or less widely among themselves, and not agreeing even in essential principles. First, there are they, who with Locke affirm that it is possible for matter to think, and they deny that there is any conclusive proof of the soul's spirituality. It is not easy to assign any arguments advanced by this class of authors amounting to

¹ Jeremias xii. 1.

² Job xxi. 7.

more than vague generalities and unwarranted negatives; unless we accept as possessing some positive logical value Locke's theory of ideas and substance. He identifies the idea in the intellect with the impression on the sensible organ; that is, the image of the visible object formed on the retina of the eye, for example, is transposed to the intellect, where it has added to it the perfections that make of it the mental idea; but it is in other respects the same image that was projected on the retina of the eye. This might be passed by, if intended merely for a description of brute thought; but the arguments which are advanced above to prove the spirituality of the human soul, are a sufficient proof that this is no description of the idea in the human intellect. The image in the sensible organ always represents a singular or concrete object, or it is of this individual material thing; the idea in the intellect expresses the abstract, the universal, and therefore the supersensible; by consequence, the intellect must itself be above or superior to organic power. Locke also asserts that we know nothing of substance, we can know only its qualities and accidents; whence it follows that we are unable to know with certainty whether or not the substance can think. It is true that while we know the qualities and accidents of such substance immediately, we know the substance itself only by way of inference from them; but does it follow that we know nothing of a thing, even when we know it as the necessary conclusion from its evident premises? To admit such principle is to deny all scientific and demonstrative truth, and Mr. Locke's inept reasoning about substance must also be included in this destruction, along with all the most precious knowledge which can be acquired by reason. We know real beings only by means of their action; and that action as seen by us is, for our minds, the measure of their nature. We do not see those beings in their own intrinsic essence, but they manifest themselves to us by their action, their powers and qualities; and it is absurd to say that from no number of effects and signs can we conclude to the certain knowledge of their cause, for that is to deny the validity even of geometrical demonstration. Hence, while our minds do not immediately apprehend material substance, or any other substance, but know it only by way of a rational act, yet it is absurd to affirm that all the real qualities, effects, and signs, manifested by material substance, found in our minds no certain knowledge of its nature as substance.

There is another class of authors who seem to differ from Locke, rather in the manner of wording and presenting their theory, than in what is essential to the theory itself; they teach that all our certain knowledge of real things is limited to their phenomena, *i. e.*, to the direct sensible manifestation of their qualities and accidents;

substance, spirit, etc., are unknowable. Others explain all things by the correlation and conservation of forces, or, as Herbert Spencer enunciates it, everything knowable "may be expressed in terms of matter, motion, and force." It will not be out of place here to state the main principles of this theory by which everything that can be known is reduced to force, and the phenomena of force;¹ but they repudiate, however, "vague and barren disputations concerning materialism and spiritualism;" also they would fain, but they cannot, relieve all terms of the meanings given to them by "metaphysical psychology." Hence they confess their embarrassment at being unable to say just what they wish; or, as Maudsley, who speaks the language of the school, puts it, "he must use words which have already meanings of a metaphysical kind attached to them, and which, when used, are therefore for him more or less a misinterpretation."² But these authors do not draw the legitimate conclusion from this unwillingness of mankind or their inability, it may be, to change the established meaning of terms: mankind are right; it is the "scientists" that are wrong in their use of terms.

According to this hypothesis, then, all things in nature are mere force. But, in order to account for the differences among the objects observable by us, this force is distinguished by most of the school into six kinds: 1st, the force or momentum of moving bodies; 2d, heat, in molecules or atoms; 3d, light, consisting of molecules or atoms; 4th, chemical force; 5th, electricity; 6th, nerve force or vital force, allied to electricity; to this enumeration of forces Balfour Stewart adds, "energy of position," or, vantage-ground. Each one of these forces has its correlated or corresponding forces into which it may be transmuted by the agency of some other force; this connection or relation among forces by which one may be changed into another, is that which is meant by the "correlation of forces." Since matter is never increased or diminished by the various transmutations that take place in it, its quantity remaining constant under all possible changes of force into force; it follows that "the sum of all the forces in nature is a constant quantity," or, as Bain says, "It is an essential part of the doctrine that force is never absolutely created, and never absolutely destroyed, but merely transmuted in form or manifestation." By the "conservation" or "persistence of force," therefore, they seem to understand only the invariability of absolute quantity as to the

¹ Mill says that at the present time, "it is universally allowed that the existence of matter or spirit is, in its nature, unsusceptible of being proved."—*Logic, Introduction*, p. 5.

² *Body and Mind*, preface, by Maudsley. They wish to put all metaphysical truth, it would seem, within the category of the fanciful.

mass or total of matter. Of this point Spencer says,¹ "Persistence of force is an ultimate truth of which no inductive proof is possible," *i. e.*, without a vicious circle. And again,² "By the persistence of force we really mean the persistence of some power which transcends our knowledge and conception. The manifestations do not persist, but that which does persist is the unknown cause of these manifestations."

It is evident, then, that the "scientists" do not agree in their opinions concerning the nature of this force whose "transmutations and manifestations" constitute the only objects which can be known by man. What is this force in itself? Is it something concrete and subsistent; is it something existent in itself, or is it something inherent in another thing as its subject? Is it the degree of power exerted, is it the agent itself, or is it both of them? In what does it differ from substance, nature, accident, and property, vulgarly so called among less "advanced thinkers?" What must be added to force in order to constitute with it "nerve force?" The answer is, "nerve;" but the question then is, what is "nerve?" The answer must be, "force." Spencer says truly, therefore, that the argument in proof of this one, constant or persistent force, is a vicious circle; but then, on the other hand, the thing is very obscure, and it is also doubtful as to what it is, and whether it is. What other reasons can be demanded in proof of falsity than that a statement is obscure and uncertain, and, at the same time, that its logical proof involves a vicious circle? Under this respect, then, the hypothesis which reduces all knowable things to one persistent, mere force, has less appearance of being a conclusion reached by reason than it has of being only a figment of the fancy. The advocates of the system seldom attempt giving strict definitions, and, indeed, definition is perilous for the mere theorist. Mill simply consigns questions regarding the nature of substance to the category of idle disputations about what is unknowable; Spencer, who, while he does not equal Mill in mere style of composition, seems much to surpass him in philosophical acumen, evades the plain fallacies by his equivocal assertion, that "only in a doctrine which recognizes the unknown cause as coextensive with all orders of phenomena can there be a consistent religion or a consistent science;"³ this proposition is equivocal, for it may be taken in a pantheistic sense or not, just as it best suits the exigencies of argument. But many of the authors belonging to this class, including Huxley, and most of the same school in the United States, should, perhaps, rather be styled idealists than materialists. They refuse to argue concerning the nature of the soul, about which they

¹ *First Principles*, p. 252.

² *Ibid.*, Part II., ch. v.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

allege that nothing can be known, and, like pagans in the Areopagus, they pay offerings only to an unknown God. With men who make such a use of logic, plain facts, and the very testimony of all nature, there is no reasoning; and indeed there is no need of reasoning, since such notions can never be adopted by many minds; for, from the days of Pyrrho, the only answer given by the mass of sensible people to total skepticism and pure idealism was ridicule and laughter, and this is the only answer that seems justly due to either, as they are opposed to the evident first conclusions of good common sense.

The slurs on "metaphysical psychology," the refusal to argue "questions concerning materialism and spiritualism because vague and barren," can scarcely be considered either as loyal to truth or as ingenuous; such things are certainly unworthy either of philosophy or of philosophers. The denial of "the metaphysical," as well as their assertion that "the spiritual is not knowable," are vague negations, which they do not attempt to support by any demonstrative proof, nor do they attempt to refute the arguments usually advanced in proof of the soul's spirituality. As they do not give definitions, they are always at liberty to deny that their adversaries rightly apprehend their meaning. What do they mean by "metaphysical terms," "metaphysical reasoning?" Is not all absolute and necessary truth metaphysical? Is not even all abstract truth, in its way and degree, metaphysical? How can they form an argument that is conclusive, and that, at the same time, implies no metaphysical element? Do they not admit the principle of contradiction as explained in the logics? and yet this principle of contradiction is the ultimate metaphysical canon of all reasoning. It is self-contradiction for one to deny the metaphysical, who attempts to demonstrate a proposition by its reason.

If we assume, with Spencer, that the ideas in our minds, regarding the various manifestations of force, motion, and matter, are objectively real, or, in other words, that these three things are real objects existing concretely outside of the mind; then the arguments for the immateriality and spirituality of man's soul will apply to physical things thus conceived, with the same force that they have when applied to material things as they are understood by mankind in general, notwithstanding "the unknowable cause," which Spencer assigns for them: in any theory, his "force, motion, and matter," are, in themselves, merely sensible objects.

Apart from the question concerning the spirituality of the human soul, there are many serious objections to this theory which claims to explain all visible things by "the correlation and conservation of force;" first, it seems to be merely an arbitrary hypothesis which, without demonstrating any new thesis to explain the cre-

ated things around us, yet makes the extraordinary assertion that all man's previous ideas of real things, as classified under the "ten categories," are false. We are now to believe that such things as substance, quality, essence, property, accident, etc., are terms "of a metaphysical meaning," that express nothing but empty speculation founded on no reality. We must, henceforth, reduce all the species and families of things to unity, and their unit is force, but an undefined and undefinable force. Why not as well make that central unit to which all is reduced, "electricity," or "heat," or "motion?" For, it is sure that we can so strain our fancies of objects pictured before the mind, and so order our terms for things, as to reduce every phenomenon to some or other correlation of "electricity," or "motion," or "heat," just as, for example, we can when in total darkness, by dint of effort, compel the strained eye to see within itself every hue and figure of things possible and impossible. In fact, many a philosophical hypothesis has, in the end, proved to be a poorly devised figment of the fancy. Again, this hypothesis denies all the conclusions of general experience, concerning the qualities and properties of material things, as it also denies the previous teachings of physical science. Finally, as these authors propound the system, it pretends to explain philosophically the physical things of nature, as well as the facts and principles of mental operations, and yet it repudiates the essential basis of all philosophical reasoning, *i. e.*, it absurdly rejects absolute and necessary truth, stigmatizing it as "metaphysics," by which its votaries appear to mean, frivolous speculation, having no more value than day-dreaming.

It is but just, before concluding these remarks, to consider, at least briefly, the often-repeated complaint made by these physicists, that the "metaphysical psychologists" very absurdly ignore the conclusions of physiology, as well as the discoveries of other natural sciences, "without even having been at the pains of making themselves acquainted with what these conclusions and discoveries are."¹ Perhaps a like complaint may be made with equal justice against the "scientists" for repudiating "metaphysics," or absolute truths, and the conclusions from them.²

It cannot be doubted that the combined study of physiology and sound philosophy, gives mutual aid to these branches of knowledge, as already observed. But, in this matter, let us not

¹ Body and Mind, by Maudsley.

² Argyll, *Primeval Man*, Part I., rebukes, in pertinent terms, this conduct of "positivists" in ostracizing the philosophical investigation of their doctrines, and he cites for censure Mr. Lewes's words, interdicting all study of the "unknowable:" "Whatever is inaccessible to reason should be strictly interdicted to research." Among these questions forbidden by Mr. Lewes, we must reckon those concerning spiritual natures and the existence of a personal God.

affirm either more or less than the truth: the only knowledge of sensible things required for the perfect validity of the argument demonstrating the immateriality of the human soul, is that which regards the well-known and invariable properties of material substance, which determine its specific nature as matter, in other words, such qualities of all matter as are known to the mass of mankind. The particular qualities of matter in this or that species do not concern the argument. Just as the mathematician need not know the best kind of timber or the right temper of steel for bridge-building, in order to know demonstratively that, out of these materials, a triangular brace cannot be made, one of whose sides is longer than the sum of the two others, so, by a like proportion, in order to know demonstratively that intellectual action specifically exceeds the power of matter, it is not at all necessary to know all the ganglia or nerve-cellules in the labyrinth of the brain. What else can be discovered, inspected, and analyzed in the brain, than organs, shapes, adaptations, and constituents of organs, as related to organic action? As mechanics and engineering must take their absolute principles from mathematics, which, under this respect, has supremacy over those branches; so, the physiologist that will reason about spirit, or spiritual nature, is dependent, for the principles that must direct him, on another science, physiology aiding the argument only in an indirect manner, or inasmuch as organ or matter is *not* spirit. It is manifest that some knowledge of man's sensible organs, or of his external and internal senses, is strictly necessary for comprehending the intellect's action as dependent for its objects on the ministry of these organs. But yet, it still remains true that learning in the theories of physiology is not necessary for demonstrating the immateriality, spirituality, and immortality of the human soul, for, since physiological science is concerned only about particular forms of matter, as this organ of vital action, this tissue, these cells, etc., and not about the necessary and universal predicates of all matter, its own special conclusions do not really and directly pertain to the argument at all.
