

- HIYA, no. *Deoria Chutia*, HOYA. *Khyeng, A. and B.*, HIA. (*Japanese*, IYA.)
KA, and. *Tharu*, KA. *Pahri*, KHA. *Chentsu, C. I.*, KE.
KEHANG, when. *Chentsu, C. I.*, KEKHAN. *Sunwar*, GENA. *Denwar*, KANHIN.
KIYEDANG, near. *Tamil, Irula, Malabar, S. I.*, KITTA.
KUYA, below. *Uraon, C. I.*, KIYAH. *Waling*, AKHUKYU.
NAKAHA, now. *Mundala, C. I.*, NAHA *Kahling*, ANAGNA.
OTA, much. *Sang-pang*, OTTO. *Santali, C. I.*, ATUA. *Vayu*, HA-TA (how much?)
TEHANG, far. *Chepang*, DYANG-TO.
TOKETU, how. *Nachhereng*, DAKHTO.
WANGNA, now. *Balali*, HOGNO.
IS (IYE), he. *Kusunda*, ISI. *Denwar, I. Tulwa, S. I.*, AYE. (*Chinese*, YI. *Ma-lay*, IYA.)
MISH (MA), I. *Sokpa*, MI. *Pakhya*, MA. *Darhi*, MA-I.
NISH (NIYE), thou. *Kota, S. I.*, NI-YE. *Uraon, C. I.*, NI-EN. *Gyami*, NI. (*Chinese*, NI.)
NITA, thine. *Gyami*, NI-TI. *Telegu*, NIDI. (*Chinese*, NI-THI.)
TAKU, what. *Rodong*, DAKO. *Dungmali*, TIGO. *Waling*, TIKWA.
TAKU, anything. *Manyak*, TAKA. *Keikadi, C. I.*, YEDAGAO.
UNGKITA, our. *Badaga, S. I.*, YENGADU. *Waling*, ANG-KAPIK. *Dungmali*, ANG-CHAGA.
UNGKIYE, we. *Rungchenbung*, UNG-KAN. *Kiranti*, ANKAN. *Chourasya*, UNGGU-TICHA.
WANGZHI, one. *Madi, C. I.*, WANDI. *Rutluk*, WUNDI.

HOW SHALL WE MEET THE SCIENTIFIC HERESIES OF THE DAY?

European Civilization; Protestantism and Catholicity Compared. By Rev. J. Balmes. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1866.

History of Civilization. By F. Guizot. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1850.

IT has not been more than seven years ago since it was generally and confidently represented that the Catholic Church was an effete institution, whose days of usefulness had passed, and which lacked only some exigency to demonstrate the utter absence, in her, of any principle of stability. This was so signally manifest as to justify the successive predictions, that the convening of the Œcumenical Council, and the definition of the dogma of Infallibility, would amply suffice to resolve her into a thousand discordant elements. That she did not so collapse—that she presented to view a unity of spirit and of action unprecedented in the history of the world, bespeaks, in her, a reprehensible defiance of the laws of existence which those interested in the study of her decadence were pleased to assign her. Of late years—since the adjournment of the Council—we have not been favored with any of these gloomy predictions. The shoe now appears to pinch the other foot. The

greatest danger to the liberties of mankind, and to the advance of the intellect, is to be apprehended from the existence of an institution which has lately given such signal proofs that she has lost none of the vigor which she displayed during the middle ages. She is averse to innovation ; she is the great impediment to the progress of civilization ; therefore she must be remorselessly attacked.

Attack follows attack, from every quarter ; and even the circumstance that her enemies oppose her with theories mutually irreconcilable, does not seem to impair in the least the harmony of the onslaught. They fraternize, in the face of the common foe, as cordially as hearts that beat as one. The melancholy burden to which all these attacks are attuned, is that she wantonly opposes the generous spirit of every age. This solemn dirge—caught from their unhappy master—breaks out in mystic refrain at every utterance. She disclaims the imputation ; and appeals to her own professions, and to the record of ages. The only response she is vouchsafed, is—Thought, Thought, Thought. To this entity they pay divine honors, make it the infallible arbiter of truth and falsehood, of good and evil ; and, when it tricks them, makes sport of their longings, refuses to aid them, and casts them upon the shores of the “ Unknowable,” they even then dare not question its rights to an apotheosis, but, in awe and trembling, sink their voices to a whisper, and increase their adoration by bowing down before their God, with all the fervor shown by a savage to his fetich.

It is a source of unfeigned regret that the adversaries of the Church should differ with us. But how is it to be remedied ? Most assuredly not by following their suggestions ; for, were it consistent with our principles, to reconcile the Church with “ modern thought,” we would be unable to conceive by what means we should bring it about. If she adopted the tenets of one set of philosophers, she would still retain the undying hatred of the thousand and one other schools which are united together only by the bond of a common opposition to her. Even our newly-made brethren, finding their occupation gone, would cherish for her no kindly feelings, but, one by one, silently steal away to the camps of the allied forces. And so on, *mutatis mutandis*, until she had swung the whole circuit, all her efforts at reconciliation brought to naught.

The one department of knowledge in which the least successful attack has been made, is that styled the philosophy of history. It has been found impossible to gainsay the importance of the Church as a factor in the development of civilization. Each unfriendly writer is constrained to say a word in her favor ; and the most amusing feature is, that we need only to extract from the tomes of each of them the several tributes which they respectively pay to the genius of the Church, and marshal them in array ; and there

will be found to be absolutely no room left for the operation of other causes! The reason is, that each of these masters of the philosophy of history is more than honest in assigning a specific influence to the Church, in order to wing his hostile shaft with a show of impartiality. The result is, that the aggregate effect of this politic generosity is wholly to preclude the concurrence of those natural factors which we all know played prominent parts in the progress of civilization.

These theories of civilization all gain in attractiveness and repute, in proportion as they wear the livery of heterodoxy. The degree of departure from Catholic truth, constitutes the measure of the ability which they severally display. Conspicuous among those engaged in the task of distorting facts to the prejudice of Catholicity, is M. Guizot. Too consummate an artist not to recognize that it is *from* the true purpose of misrepresentation to bestow unqualified censure upon that which he would attack, he adroitly and skilfully insinuates, here and there, among the encomiums which he pays the Church, masterly and delicate touches which, well worked up, develop, by a seemingly fair process, into the grand *denouement* which he has had ever in view, viz., that out of the needs and shortcomings of Catholicity, was normally evolved Protestantism. We desire here to draw attention to one of these preparations for the attainment of his brilliant climax.

He says:

“All this seemed greatly in favor of the Church, of its unity, and of its power. While, however, the popes of Rome sought to usurp the government of the world, while the monasteries enforced a better code of morals and a severer form of discipline, a few mighty, though solitary individuals, protested in favor of human reason, and asserted its claim to be heard, its right to be consulted, in the formation of man's opinions. The greater part of these philosophers forbore to attack commonly received opinions—I mean religious creeds; all they claimed for human reason was the right to be heard—all they declared was, that she had the right to try these truths by her own tests, and that it was not enough that they should be merely affirmed by authority. John Erigena, or John Scotus, as he is more frequently called, Roscelin, Abelard, and others, became the noble interpreters of individual reason, when it now began to claim its lawful inheritance. It was the teaching and writings of these giants of their days that first put in motion that desire for intellectual liberty, which kept pace with the reform of Gregory VII. and St. Bernard. If we examine the general character of this movement of mind, we shall find that it sought not a change of opinion, that it did not array itself against the received system of faith; but that it simply advocated the right of reason to work for itself—in short, the right of free inquiry. . . . The importance of this first attempt after liberty, or this re-birth of the spirit of free inquiry, was not long in making itself felt. Though busied with its own reform, the Church soon took the alarm, and at once declared war against these new reformers, *whose methods gave it more reason to fear than their doctrines.*” Pp. 147–8.

Guizot here intimates that not only does the Church require our belief in her dogmas, but that, in outrageous violation of the freedom of thought, she prescribes the very operations of the mind in as-

senting thereto, and in comprehending them; that she furnishes the very logic by which we are bound to harmonize them with the relations of the natural order; that she enjoins upon us the principles upon which rest their reciprocal dependence; that she reprobates the practice of using other methods, even though they should lead to orthodox results; and, in fine, that she authoritatively maps out all the highways, byways, lanes, and footpaths of the whole domain of thought, so as wholly to preclude all originality or progress in the natural order. He charges that it was the exercise of reason otherwise than in the approved grooves, and not merely the perversion of essential doctrines, which she feared. He contends that the Church discountenanced and feared any departure from the set canons of logic, however innocent of heresy or of schism such a course might be. To judge from Guizot's portrayal of the character of this intellectual movement, one would presume that a philosopher, in the middle ages—or, by implication now—dared not propound to himself a speculative problem, such as: Given certain established principles of the natural order, what is the conformity of the philosophic result with a certain dogma? but, that dogma, philosophic result, and mode of attaining that result were alike given by the Church, and to be followed by the faithful, under peril of temporal and eternal damnation.

In refutation of Guizot's skilfully preferred declaration, that Eriгена, Roscelin, and Abelard "forbore to attack commonly received opinions—I mean religious creeds;" that they "sought not a change of opinion," and "did not array" themselves "against the received system of faith;" Balmes adduces evidence to the contrary, so conclusive that Guizot's knowledge of history can only be vindicated at the expense of his good faith. Balmes shows, beyond all possibility of question, that these individuals held and maintained doctrines which were in direct and unmistakable conflict with the most salient dogmas of the faith; and that it was for stolidly persisting in the dissemination of these errors, and for that alone, for which they were condemned. Eriгена broached and maintained erroneous doctrines on the subject of the Eucharist, of predestination, and of grace. Roscelin called into question the sacred mystery of the Trinity. Abelard held and maintained the opinions of Arius on the Trinity; those of Nestorius on the Incarnation; and those of Pelagius on grace. "All this," says Balmes, "did not merely *tend* to a radical change of doctrine, but actually was one."

The *gravamen* of Guizot's charge is plainly expressed in the sentence wherein he says, their "methods gave her (the Church) more reason to fear than their doctrines." Now, the Church proscribes no method. Methods rise and fall in the Church, as elsewhere;

spring into existence, coexist, attain to greater or less influence, and fall into desuetude. The history of the Catholic Church is a history of methods, and, in this *Review*, even, can be discerned the impress, respectively, of the scholastic, Platonic, and modern or so-called scientific method. The Platonic, the neo-Platonic, the scholastic, the "scientific," with all their countless shades and modifications, have ruled and swayed the intellects of the Church. The beauty of Catholic thought is, that having fixed principles of belief, it is able, upon any method, to attain to a scientific coherency impossible with those beaten about by the waves of thought which ever threaten submersion, when not regulated by some compass or rudder. It has been asserted that the belief in revelation, and in the authority of the Church, restricts and cramps the exercise of the intellect. With equal propriety could it be alleged that the use of the compass militates against the operation of the laws of the elements. Thought is not the less free because it is enlightened.

The Church requires the acceptance of the *credenda*; but it matters not to her whether the dogmas essential to salvation are received in gross, or whether they are marshalled in conformity with analytic, synthetic, "scientific," or other views of philosophy. True it is, she at times favors the pursuance of a special method; but she condemns none. Truth is one; and the very fact that a course constitutes a method, implies that it possesses some of the coherency and consistency of truth. If, then, the principles which give body and form to a method are examined and followed out, the result must be the confirmation of Catholic doctrine.

A variety of methods now obtain in the Church, and coexist with perfect harmony of belief. The motto of the Church is, "*In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas.*" One school comprises those who contend that our general ideas are furnished by the mind alone; that they are directly seen by the mind, and are acquired neither through the senses nor by reflection. The genius of this school is synthetic, and deeming itself endowed, *a priori*, with principles which underlie all knowledge, it regards as feasible the scientific explication of the nexus subsisting between the natural and the supernatural, and the formation of the two orders and their mutual relations into a synthetic whole. Those of another school declare that the natural intellect cannot acquire ideas independently of sensation. They contend that, as our modes of thought, criteria, and canons of logic, are the outcome of the natural order, they can acquaint us with the supernatural only in distinct and separate sections, and not to the extent necessary to enable us to embrace it within a synthesis, or to apprehend, scientifically, the nature of the nexus which binds the whole. They concede that the Creator's works form a complete and harmonious whole, and that the natu-

ral has its complement or fulfilment in the supernatural. They contend, however, that it is impossible to gauge the relations of the two orders with anything like precision ; and deny that the knowledge of the supernatural is susceptible of a continual and indefinite progress, corresponding with the advancement of our knowledge of philosophy.

Although these methods, as above given, are not in perfect harmony with the prevailing tone of philosophic thought in the Church, they are yet permissible. The Church has ever deemed it wise and just to refrain from any condemnation of a method, however much it may fail to chime in with the views of the major portion of her doctors. If, however, the method tolerated works out a result in conflict with any portion of her sacred deposit of truth, she visits with her censure the incongruous product ; but leaves the rest of the method as much intact as is compatible with the truncation of its condemned corollary. This policy is impartially extended to the method for which she may display a preference. It is not the exercise of the intellect in a manner productive of heretical results which the Church visits with her censure. It is the promulgation of the resultant fallacy, with a view to disturb the convictions of the faithful, which constitutes the offence.

In pursuance of his answer to Guizot, Balmes says :

“Still the same confusion of ideas. I have said already, and must repeat here that the Church has condemned no method ; it was not a *method*, but error, that the Church condemned, unless by a method be meant an assault upon the articles of faith, under pretence of breaking the fetters of authority, which is not merely a method, but an error of the very highest import. In reproving a pernicious doctrine, subversive of all faith, and denying the infallibility of the See of St. Peter in matters of doctrine, the Church did not put forth any new pretensions ; her conduct has always been the same ever since the time of the apostles, and is the same still. The moment a doctrine is propagated that appears in the least degree dangerous, the Church examines, compares it with the sacred deposit of faith confided to her : if the doctrine is not inconsistent with divine truth, she allows it free circulation, for she is not ignorant that *God has given up the world to the controversies of men* ; but if it is opposed to the faith, its condemnation is irremissible, without concern or regret. Were the Church to act otherwise, she would contradict herself, and cease to be what she is, the jealous depository of divine truth. If she allowed her infallible authority to be questioned, that moment she would forget one of her most sacred obligations, and would lose all claim on our belief ; for, in betraying an indifference for truth, she would prove herself to be no longer a religion descended from Heaven, but a mere delusion.”

The most telling commentary upon Guizot's charge is, that the method for the alleged suppression of which he arraigns the Church, is the very method which has been incorporated into her philosophy, and to which she has extended her greatest favors. Those “solitary, though mighty individuals,” were not the inaugurators of this mode of thought. Erigena lived in the ninth century, wherein philosophy was a strange compound of Grecian eclecticism and

Christian ideas, with Platonism acting the rôle of a co-ordinating principle. Erigena differed with his contemporaries in no respect, save in his heterodox conclusions. The succeeding century was the darkest period of ignorance, during the middle ages. In the eleventh century, in which Roscelin and Abelard flourished, this method of thought had sprung into existence, challenged the attention of the Doctors of the Church, and commanded the sympathies of hundreds of the faithful, long before Roscelin or Abelard made their entrance on the intellectual arena. The process of reasoning which it inculcated, had been imported from Spain into Catholic Europe, by the perusal of the writings of Averroes, Avicenna, and other Moorish philosophers, who had displayed a dialectical superiority over their Christian adversaries by reason of the consistency and beauty of their philosophy. In Roscelin and Abelard's time, however, the introduction of this mode of thought was not complete, but formed only an ingredient in a bizarre mixture of incongruous methods, which were eminently calculated to lead to erroneous results. This method, which Guizot so much lauds, was, and is, none other than the Aristotelian philosophy which, at the epoch in question, was fast attaining to the reputation in which the Church afterwards held it. It is, indeed, the identical method which, for nearly three centuries, has constituted the stock reproach to the Church. Starting with the Stagyrte, it found a congenial home with those consummate mathematicians, the Arabians. It was the efficient means by which the Moors were enabled to attain to such progress in the natural sciences. Among the Catholics, its reception was first hailed with pleasure by those engaged in physical investigations. St. Thomas Aquinas, himself brought up in the physical school under the direction of Albertus Magnus, demonstrated its almost infinite capabilities by using it for the elaboration of Catholic doctrine into a symmetrical whole. In the works of the Angelic Doctor it found its crowning result; and this very method to which Guizot would have us believe the Church was instinctively and irreconcilably averse, shared with the Holy Scriptures the honor of informing the conscience of the Council of Trent.

To this method is ascribable whatever of truth or value appears in the labors of Leibnitz, Descartes, Bacon, Locke, and the modern scientists. It is a fact which cannot be disguised, that whenever science departs from its true paths, the departure is in a direct ratio with the relinquishment of this method. Platonic ideas then crop out, and truth suffers in proportion.

History proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this philosophical method which has prevailed in the Church for nearly eight centuries, has conclusively established its applicability to every department of thought. The possession of a suitable method, how-

ever, is not sufficient. A knowledge of the field to which it is to be applied is equally necessary. It must be admitted that here, in America, our acquaintance with the prevailing controversies is not commensurate with the efficiency of our method. It becomes incumbent on us to guard vigilantly against the springing up of a literature and mode of thought tinctured with modern infidelity. We are all aware how the small Catholic representation we have had in English-speaking countries, for the last three centuries, has suffered the dissemination of prejudices hostile to our religion. We are all sensible of the Augean task involved in the dissipation of that evil. Now, this taint, with which English and American literature has been sullied by Protestant misrepresentation, must not be allowed to repeat itself in another shape.

The numberless discoveries now being made in the natural sciences are opening up before us wide vistas of thought, in which those bent on tracing a want of harmony between science and religion, are allowed to disport themselves without control or hindrance, and to misinterpret every phenomenon into an argument in favor of infidelity. These men stand at the portals of science, and brand with their pernicious stamp every fact as it is developed. They even levy contributions upon the rich treasures of intellectual gold stored amid the tomes of the middle ages; and surreptitiously convert them into the current coin of the age, whilst affecting to hold them in supreme contempt. The evil is spreading here in America, silently and slowly, but most extensively. In Europe, the expression of disbelief is, in some degree, a measure of its extent. But in this country it is otherwise. The affected deference to religious prejudices, and absence of the spirit of proselytism—which are said to be characteristic of the movement—obtain here more fully. This only increases the danger. There is scarce an intellectual coterie in America in which it is not possible for a person conversant with the signs of the times, to discern the extent of the ravages of this deadly gangrene.

Now, this intellectual activity must not be allowed to pursue the false direction which it is taking. The antidote must be made to develop concurrently with the bane. To our mind, there exists an imperious necessity for the cultivation, in our seminaries, of the mathematical and physical sciences. There is no need, or occasion, for anything like a change in the method at present prevailing in the Church. That method is the daughter of the natural sciences, and nowhere has it found a more congenial field of action than amid questions akin to those which at present agitate society. Change it not; but extend its application to the complexion of the present time. Let it be recognized that the site of the battle-field has been shifted. Let it be remembered that the intellectual activity of the

Church has ever manifested itself in the direction whence the attack came. This has been evident in every age; in the time of St. Thomas, when a spurious Aristotelianism was threatening the faithful; and especially at the epoch of the Reformation. The Society of Jesus then appeared on the scene, and combated the evil with the very means by which it was propagated. How far the methods adopted by the Jesuits point the moral indicated in this article, we prefer to let Balmes and Macaulay show.

Balmes says, p. 269 :

“ When we fix our attention on the institute of the Jesuits, on the time of its foundation, on the rapidity and greatness of its progress, we find the important truth which I have before pointed out more and more confirmed, viz., that the Catholic Church, with wonderful fruitfulness, always furnishes an idea worthy of her to meet all the necessities which arise. Protestantism opposed the Catholic doctrines with the pomp and parade of knowledge and learning; the *éclat* of human literature, the knowledge of languages, the taste for the models of antiquity, were all employed against religion with a constancy and ardor worthy of a better cause. Incredible efforts were made to destroy the pontifical authority. When they could not destroy it they attempted at least to weaken and discredit it. The evil spread with fearful rapidity. The mortal poison already circulated in the veins of a considerable portion of the European nations; the contagion began to be propagated even in countries which had remained faithful to the truth. To complete the misfortune, schism and heresy, traversing the seas, corrupted the faith of the simple neophytes of the New World. What was to be done in such a crisis? Could such great evils be remedied by ordinary means? Was it possible to make head against such great and imminent perils by employing common arms? Was it not proper to make some on purpose for such a struggle, to temper the cuirass and the shield, to fit them for this new kind of warfare, in order that the cause of truth might not appear in the new arena under fatal disadvantages? Who can doubt that the appearance of the Jesuits was the answer to these questions, that their institute was the solution of the problem?

“ The spirit of the coming ages was essentially one of scientific and literary progress. The Jesuits were aware of this truth: they perfectly understood it.

“ It was necessary to advance with rapidity and never to remain behind. This the new institute does; it takes the lead in all sciences; it allows none to anticipate it. Men study the Oriental languages; they produce great works on the Bible; they search the books of the ancient Fathers, the monuments of tradition and of ecclesiastical decisions; in the midst of this great activity the Jesuits are at their posts; many super-eminent works issue from their colleges. The taste for dogmatical controversy is spread over all Europe; many schools preserve and love the scholastic discussions; immortal works of controversy come from the hands of the Jesuits, at the same time they yield to none in skill and penetration in the schools. The mathematics, astronomy, all the natural sciences, make great progress; learned societies are formed in the capitals of Europe to cultivate and encourage them; in these societies the Jesuits figure in the first rank.”

Macaulay says, ch. vi. :

“ When the Jesuits came to the rescue of the papacy they found it in extreme peril; but from that moment the tide of battle turned. Protestantism, which had, during the whole generation, carried all before it, was stopped in its progress, and rapidly beaten back from the foot of the Alps to the shores of the Baltic. Before the order had existed a hundred years, it had filled the whole world with memorials of great things done and suffered for the faith. No religious community could produce a list of men so variously distinguished; none had extended its operations over so vast a space; yet

in none had there ever been such perfect unity of feeling and action. There was no region of the globe, no walk of speculative or of active life, in which Jesuits were not to be found. They guided the counsels of kings. They deciphered Latin inscriptions. They observed the motions of Jupiter's satellites. They published whole libraries, controversy, casuistry, history, treatises on optics, Alcaic odes, editions of the fathers, madrigals, catechisms, and lampoons. The liberal education of youth passed entirely into their hands, and was conducted by them with conspicuous ability."

In England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the education of the clergy is fast being regulated with a view to the correction of the crying evil of the day. The necessity becomes the greater here in America, when we recognize the fact that the "Tractarian movement" has not as yet spent itself, but is only in abeyance, awaiting the issue of the conflict between Catholicity and infidelity. There are hundreds who are fully convinced that Protestantism is a failure, both logically and practically, but who shrink from communion with the fold, in fear lest when they resolve one doubt, they shall be confronted with another respecting the creation and moral government of the universe. In this state of hesitancy, one so situated is subjected to influences which insensibly create a bias hostile to religion. Unless he chances to meet with one of those few priests whose intercourse with the current of European thought has led him to the study of these problems, he will probably go away with his doubts undispelled. Not that the priest has not at hand, in the form of principle, the needed remedy, but because the person in doubt requires a specific application of the principle to his own intellectual difficulties. It is true that the errors of "modern thought" are not new. They are, at bottom, nothing more than a revamping of old materialistic heresies under new forms and with a changed terminology, often and long ago exploded; but the necessity of refuting these errors under their new forms and in their relation to the science of the day is not, on this account, the less urgent. What will a consideration of the heresies of the Monophysites, the Eutychians, or the Arians, avail a person confused by the specious doctrines of "modern scientists?" Can he counteract the malaria which everywhere surrounds him, and of whose baneful influence he is only vaguely conscious, by listening to a masterly disquisition upon the pernicious effects of the Manichean heresy? How can tone be given to his mind by a recapitulation of the countless absurdities and evils which emanated from that Pandora box, yclept the Reformation? Of what value to him are those stores of Biblical and Patristic knowledge, which so signally proved their usefulness during and succeeding the Tractarian movement, to dissipate those incipient misgivings which harass and trouble him? No; his ailment, inasmuch as it has taken a different direction, requires a different remedy, having some relation to that which it is designed to correct.

The Jesuits, we rejoice to see, are evincing their sense of the greatness of the danger. They are systematizing their efforts in this direction, by giving a greater degree of attention to their mathematical and scientific studies. Divers works have of late appeared, written by members of that society, which give assurance that they are as ever on the alert to counteract the bane with its antidote. Their influence is not to be measured merely by the number of their literary productions. They have numberless youths under their care, and we are of the impression that they are assiduously sowing in their minds seed which will produce a rich crop of usefulness.

It has been contended that there is no necessity for any preparation to arrest the oncoming tide of infidelity which apparently threatens to inundate the whole field of science. The reason alleged is, that religion has prescription on her side. She has stood for thousands of years, and has ever formed the substratum upon which morality, society, and government have been built; therefore, the strong presumption of truth is with her, and the *onus probandi* upon her adversaries, and not upon her; that she cannot be required to answer objections, nor can apparent objections be deemed disproofs until, first, infidelity has attained to the breadth, general symmetry, and legitimate synthetical arrangement, which characterizes Christianity; until, second, infidelity has given trustworthy guarantees that it will be able to work good instead of harm, to individuals, to society, and to government; third, until there exists a perfect and unanimous agreement among infidels themselves as to the truth of their doctrines. It is further alleged that, as modern infidelity is professedly founded upon the natural sciences, between which and religion there cannot exist any real incompatibility, all that is required is to let infidelity pursue its course, and it will inevitably work out its own condemnation.

This argument is a strong one, and no opportunity should be lost to press it home with effect. But it must not be forgotten that many of those whom infidelity is silently and imperceptibly contaminating, are incompetent to appreciate the force of an argument which to them is merely technical, and not decisive of the merits. In the interim, whilst availing ourselves of this logical vantage-ground, and awaiting the action of the self-corrective power of advancing science, the infidelity of the age will be perverting minds to such an extent as to render the remedy immeasurably more difficult, if not well-nigh impossible. The enemies of religion are ceaselessly active. Every department of literature is fast acquiring the impress of irreligion. All the hundred special sciences are being cast in its mould. It is not the falsity of alleged facts which constitutes the ground of complaint, nor the suppression of material

facts. No, infidelity is conversant with a device worth a thousand such. It is the adjustment and marshalling of all the facts in such a way as to point inevitably to the conclusion which these infidels are desirous of establishing. They concern themselves only with their major and minor, and lay little or no stress upon the conclusion; well knowing, able dialecticians as they are, that the less said about the conclusion the better; for the reader, if left to draw the conclusion, will invest it with the greater strength, in return for the compliment to his intellect, implied by the writer leaving to him that slight intellectual exertion. Furthermore, the plan takes well, because it is made to appear that it needs not sophistry or eloquence to draw the inference, but that it is the inevitable result of the remorseless logic and irresistible eloquence of facts.

The infidelity of this age is not aggressive in appearance. It insinuates its ideas with the craft of the serpent. In every form of literature preparation is made for the introduction of the virus. Even police-court reports cannot give an account of proceedings without the use of terms of expression borrowed from the physical sciences, and fraught with disbelief. Everywhere are to be met expressions which carry with them far more than their literal interpretation will bear, and which derive their commentary from the complexion of the times. Other expressions, equally apparently innocent of assertiveness of infidelity, find attrition in the mind with those stored therein before, and the pernicious idea, flashing as a resultant from the impact, is endowed with convincing power, in direct proportion as its factitious relation and designed adjustment has been ingeniously disguised.

Thus it is that the very well-springs of thought are insidiously poisoned. The deadly tincture lurks even amid forms of literature whose innocent and peaceful aspect would seem to preclude the possibility of harm. Criticisms upon painting, poetry, sculpture, architecture, do not escape the infection. The most generous feelings and best instincts of the heart are perverted, and made the agents of their own eradication. Errors are enticingly incrusting with truths, as is the bitter pill with its sugar coating. Novels and romances are prolific of this deadly nightshade. In them are to be found psychological analyses of character which inculcate principles which, though not repulsive in themselves, are yet, by the manner in which they are instilled, susceptible of an easy and unconscious resolution into further utilitarian, necessitarian, and fatalistic principles, which need only other doses of the same too readily furnished pabulum, to develop, and warp the intellect and taint the moral character. In this way, with diabolic cunning, is the individual slowly prepared for the reception of errors which, before, he would have rejected with horror. These wily advocates

of "modern thought" are too astute to proffer their baneful fruit unheralded. This constitutes the utter absence, in them, of all spirit of proselytism. They plant only the seed in the minds of those they would seduce; they supply it with congenial soil; and they then leave it to its natural growth.

The remedy for this state of affairs is to be found in the scholastic philosophy. The critical genius of that philosophy, and the analytic habits of thought which it engenders, peculiarly fit it for the contest. The infidelity of the present century differs from that of the last century. In the former age, it concerned itself only with attacking and destroying everything which mankind held most dear. In lieu of that which it endeavored to demolish, it had nothing to offer. This fact constituted one of the causes of its ephemeral existence. In this century the needs and wants of the intellect, the craving for something tangible and positive to replace that which is subverted, have been recognized and acted upon. Negations do not satisfy the soul. Mankind are not content with disbelief. They need a system, something in which they can repose faith. Disbelief is unable to stand alone; it needs the support of a complementary belief. It is in the appreciation of this fact that we find the prevailing thirst for systems.

What finer field could there possibly be for the exercise of the analytic genius of the scholastic philosophy, than in the refutation of modern infidelity? Joined to this thought is the consideration that by this dialectical encounter we will be meeting a practical necessity, by creating an intellectual atmosphere that will serve directly as a corrective of the pernicious influences which are insidiously working their way to the souls of thousands whose eternal welfare is thereby endangered.

The present is no time for the construction of a science of the relations between theology and these new departments of knowledge. The natural sciences are not as yet ripe for such a step. Even if they were, policy would dictate that we should not so meet the attacks of the enemy. The aggressive or analytic mode of warfare is preferable to the defensive or synthetic mode. It is more in harmony with the tone of our philosophy, and is more efficient. For, when synthesis is opposed to synthesis, the blow which the weaker receives is by comparison only, and not direct; and therefore is not effective. Besides, acting on the defensive involves the necessity of defining our position with respect to every mushroom hypothesis with which our adversaries insult the name of science. If we fail in establishing the harmony, by reason of the invalidity of the hypothesis, religion has to shoulder the evil effects incident to the failure. If we appear to succeed, the subsequent refutation of the hypothesis whose harmony with our convictions we have

seemingly established, is adduced as an evidence of the subtle ingenuity with which we can, for the nonce, reconcile even an absurdity with our principles. To illustrate what we mean by this synthetic plan, we have only to refer to the many attempts at the reconciliation of Darwinism with religion, with which many well-meaning but foolish persons are wont to entertain us. A cogent reason for the American clergy assuming the direction of religion's response to this intellectual movement, is that laymen are entering the arena, wholly unprepared to treat such problems in the broad and catholic spirit with which they should be handled. Laymen have regard only to isolated problems, and prejudice religion by resort to a diversity of methods which often mutually clash. Religion is then made responsible for this discordance. Among the clergy this difficulty would not obtain. Unity of method and harmony of attack would flow from the comprehensive spirit imbued into them by community of education, and by their acquaintance with the multifold aspects of every problem bearing on religion.

The better plan is to meet all our adversaries' attacks upon their own territory. But to contend successfully against the established evil it is requisite that we should render ourselves familiar with its general complexion, study the sciences which are esteemed its strongholds, adopt its terminology so far as is consistent with our principles; cultivate a readiness in bringing to account its peculiar turns of thought; acquire a knowledge of all the shifts and devices resorted to by the enemy, and turn its weapons against itself. The moral effect of hoisting the engineer with his own petard, should not be disregarded. Apart from this, success is more assured when regard is had to the bent and inclination of the minds of those for whom the arguments are intended. No arms are needed, other than those to be found in the arsenal of the Aristotelian philosophy. All that is required is to secure their attractive presentation by burnishing them up in conformity with the fashion and taste of the age. In the tomes of the scholastics are to be found principles and canons of controversy sufficient for every exigency which has arisen, or which may arise. They need only to be clothed in the current phraseology of the day. Change only the idiom in which they are expressed, and they will meet with a cordial reception from those who are prepossessed against them. As we have before remarked, our adversaries are forestalling us in this respect.

All this does not require a thorough and extended acquaintance with all the details of all the natural sciences. What is needed is not so much a knowledge of the natural sciences, as a knowledge of their philosophy; a full insight into the mode of thought engendered by their study; and an acquaintance with that mode of thought in all its varied phases. An analytical refutation of a con-

clusion cannot be achieved without a knowledge of the premises upon which it is claimed to be based. If place is given in our seminaries—theological and lay—to the study of the mathematical and physical sciences, we shall be able to rout the enemy from the field of science, by conclusively pointing out in detail, supported by direct evidence, that the doubts which our adversaries conjure up, are doubts by reason solely of the imperfect development of the data essential to their dissipation; that the theories in which they would have us believe, are naught but crude and imperfect hypotheses violative, at every stage, of the laws and logic of their own mode of thought; that numberless and important *hiatus* everywhere abound in their boasted discoveries; that many of their laws and canons are not the legitimate outcome of science; that when their laws and canons are the legitimate outcome of science, they complacently ignore them when it subserves their purpose so to do, and substitute therefor canons and laws against which they themselves have, time and again, inveighed; that whenever they aspire above immediate induction, and attempt to co-ordinate the whole field of science with the link of some abstract principle, they not only flagrantly transgress the laws of induction, but, in addition, fall into material errors which are most glaring, and which they themselves condemn in the most unmeasured terms; that, taking for granted and applying the truth of their condemnation of certain philosophic methods, the subversal of their philosophy inevitably follows; that many of their general ideas which they profess to have acquired by induction, insult the very name of induction, and differ from Platonic ideas only in degree; that their generalizations far outstrip the accumulation of facts; that their tentative hypotheses usurp all the prerogatives of well-founded and established theories; that their methods outrage the principles of logic as they themselves define them; that they hasten too fast from the analytic to the synthetic method; that they draw general conclusions from too small a number of particular observations and experiments; that they have altogether lost that spirit of rigorous reserve, of strict cautious prudence, so constantly inculcated by Bacon and Descartes, whom they profess to hold in esteem; that they have repudiated positivism, governed by no other motive than that it bound them down too closely to the observance of their own logic; that the concurrent testimony of their own well-established principles, is that their philosophy, in so far as it conflicts with religion, is naught but a tissue of sophistry and absurdity.

The analytic method here indicated is open to none of the objections urged against the clergy taking part in the controversies of the day. It is superior to the synthetic method in this, that a failure never reacts.

X. C. S. P.