

ligious anarchy by combining with the unlicensed in denouncing the Council for subverting the Catholic faith. But those of the clergy who were favorable to the Reformation showed their partiality for the new doctrines by sacrilegiously treating the Blessed Sacrament. Instances of this sacrilegious treatment are recorded in the Register Book in Petworth parish.

The King and Lords of the Council, aware of the gravity of the situation and determined to boldly face it, decided that a new Liturgy should be drawn up and confirmed by Parliament. Penalties were to be inflicted on all who should disobey its rules and instructions.

The history of the compilation of the First Book of Common Prayer has been fully treated in *The American Catholic Quarterly Review* for April, 1901.

WILLIAM FLEMING.

London.

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#### DETERMINISM VERSUS FREE-WILL.

OF the numberless charges brought by modern science against the philosophical views of the past ages none are perhaps more strange than those which bear upon human freedom. The new philosophy, on the one hand, whilst it glories in having restored man to full liberty in social, political and religious life, accuses the old school of having ministered to oppression and tyranny by shattering the very foundation of individual rights. Denying, on the other hand, the very possibility of self-determination and subjecting all volition to inevitable necessity, it condemns the thinkers of former times for granting to the human will the power of choosing. Yet, strange as these imputations are, they are nowadays universally concurred in, and to such a degree that outside of the schools which espouse the scholastic system of philosophy free-will is nearly everywhere disclaimed as an obsolete and absurd assumption, just as ancient polities are abhorred as forms of absolutism. Whence, we may well ask, is this novel view denying the freedom of our will? Who are they that broached it first? And on what philosophical basis does it rest to win such general assent? Again, what discrepancy has been discovered in the old free-will theory to bring it into disfavor with our century of light and progress?

#### I.

True, there were adversaries of free-will also in former ages; but their number was then comparatively small, and their theories ever failed of a wide acceptance. There were, as once in ancient Greece,

the fatalists, who held that the entire universe, men and even the deity included, were ruled by blind necessity. There were the pantheists, who regarded the world with all its parts as evolved from the absolute, either by a physical or an intellectual process. But views like these, being either too abstruse or too plainly contradictory to common sense, never won the popular mind. Then came the reformers of the sixteenth century, especially Luther and Calvin, who, adjudging the human will to have been wounded in its very nature by original sin and utterly disabled for virtue, made the denial of its freedom an article of their new creed. In their mind, moreover, God, the first Cause and Supreme Ruler, so swayed and predetermined His creatures, rational as well as irrational, as to leave no room to them for self-determination. But their teaching was sectarian only and in the course of time re-reformed or even renounced by their followers.

The real basis of modern theories hostile to free-will is the materialistic view, according to which there is no difference in kind between mind and body, between thought and the vibrations of atoms and molecules, between the laws that govern the psychic activities and those which are obeyed by physical phenomena. However, materialism, espoused and commented on as it was by diverse philosophers, assumed many phases. Formerly it was developed from its own principles, but in our day it is combined with other philosophical systems and shaped in many respects to their tenets. The offspring of its union with pantheism is monism. According to this system matter is the one first and universal cause, from which all things, of whatever nature they may be, take their origin in continuous and progressive evolution; wherefore matter is supposed to be continually changing from all eternity, yet independent of any extrinsic cause; indeterminate, yet at the same time self-determining; imperfect and inert, yet the source of all perfection and activity. To their mind a personal God, distinct from the world, is allegedly inconceivable; hence they give to matter the attributes and the throne of the deity. Herbert Spencer pretends to lay a deeper foundation for monism. For, going beyond matter, he considers the Unknowable as the first and universal cause of which all forces and matter itself, being but a combination of forces, are necessary manifestations, and the entire world, physical, intellectual and social, is a regular and continuous evolution. Spencerian philosophy, which is closely allied to German pantheism, may seem to rise above the common level of materialism, since it ventures to identify matter and spirit in a higher plane, which is neither material nor spiritual. But, as closer examination shows, Mr. Spencer knows no other ultimate forces than those of attraction and repulsion peculiar to matter,

and assigns as the ultimate cause of the universe an unknowable power, which is nothing but an abstraction, the common element found in all forces and phenomena.

Attempts have also been made both by him and by other authors to wed materialism to idealism, and empiricism to Kantian rationalism. As the materialistic idealists put it, we perceive only phenomena. Whatever is beyond them is unknowable; if it be conceived in thought, it is a fiction of the mind, proved by critical analysis to be intrinsically contradictory. Hence substance, essence, cause, and likewise the principles based on them, are fictitious and unreal conceptions. Phenomena, however, are not realities existing outside of us, but only appearances in our mind, states of our consciousness connected in uninterrupted sequence. One part of them is simple and vivid, and these are taken for the outer or objective world; the other part is faint and compound, reduced to groups and orders by our own mental operation, and these constitute the inner or subjective world. The activity by which we perceive the simple and vivid phenomena, which are the elements of all knowledge, is sensuous; the activity by which we reduce them to order and thus create science is intellectual. But though thus idealized, the theory is still merged in materialism. For both activities, the intellectual as well as the sensuous, are essentially organic, the latter being the function of the external organs of sense, the former of the brain, the internal organ of the subtler and productive faculties of imagination, memory and association. And again all organic power of perception and feeling is in reality not distinct from the forces of matter. Or, in the words of materialistic authors, *mind and body are not two distinct realities, but two aspects, phases or sides of one and the same thing*. The mind with the psychic phenomena of perception and feeling, of experience and science, is the subjective; the body with the physical phenomena of attraction, of heat and of electricity is the objective aspect. Such identity of mind and body is affirmed like a fundamental dogma on account of the intimate relationship existing between them. It is nevertheless maintained that between body and mind there is a difference transcending all differences, and that psychic and physical phenomena, running in two parallel lines, have nothing in common and cannot be resolved into one another.<sup>1</sup>

Modern philosophy embodying these views is extolled as the climax of mental culture and wisdom, as the only true science, opposition to which is ignorance and superstition, as the light and glory of the age, and the final result of evolution slowly progressing through the preceding centuries.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. M. Maher, S. J., "Psychology," Stonyhurst Series, fourth edition, pp. 505-525; C. Gutberlet, "Der Kampf um die Seele," pp. 143-201. Mainz. Kirchheim, 1899.

From materialistic tenets alloyed with idealistic and evolutionary views a theory of human volition is deduced which gives the death-blow to free-will. The regularity to which the process of evolution is subject implies that all phenomena follow one another in unbroken and invariable succession, in so much that every event is uniformly preceded by another, and every subsequent event is inevitably determined by the one preceding. The very succession of the phenomena is conceived as causation or determination by an antecedent; for our cognition reaches only sequence, not internal influence. The uniformity of succession objectively constitutes law and order, but subjectively generates in our mind the idea of necessity, and is, therefore, tantamount to the principle of causality, meaning that every effect or phenomenon necessarily requires a cause. These are the first scientific principles based on experience, holding true both of physical and of psychic phenomena, though with the implication that a psychic event is determined only by a psychic, and a physical event only by a physical antecedent. The antecedent of a volition is in part the character of the agent, in part the motive rendering the action desirable. The character consists in dispositions and propensities intrinsic to the agent's organism and is either inherited from ancestors or formed by past actions. The motives arise from the pleurableness or impleurableness of the action and its object, or from the influence exercised by the environment. Character and motives determine the acts of the will with the same inevitable necessity with which one body moves another by its impulse, and with the same uniformity with which day follows night or spring follows winter. If we, therefore, could know a man's character and motives under given circumstances, we might with as much exactness foresee his conduct as astronomers foretell an eclipse of the sun to take place years afterward. But science is not yet so far advanced as to give us a perfect insight into character or certain knowledge of all influences, present and future, to be exercised by surroundings on any individual man.

In consistency with such assertions freedom of will is inconceivable. A free action proceeds from the self-determination of the agent. It is, therefore, not within the series of succeeding phenomena in nature, not inevitably determined by an antecedent, and, therefore, it is, without a cause and sufficient reason, a break in the uniformity of the universe, an exemption from law and order, a thing which science cannot reach nor the mind represent in thought. In a word, a free action or volition is a contradiction to the principle of causation, an impossibility. Accordingly, if consciousness is appealed to as a witness for its existence, its testimony is to be rejected as *a priori* false and deceptive, as so many perceptions of the senses are.

Thus free-will is unanimously arraigned by modern science, and, it would seem, stands condemned by the common opinion of the enlightened portion of mankind.

## II.

But is its case in reality lost, its defense impossible? Before entering on any discussion it will be proper to analyze the conception of free-will and so to arrive at a clear and exact definition. In a broad sense freedom of will is the capability of self-determination; the determinists also conceive it thus. But again, what is implied in such capability? Let us contrast a necessary with a self-determining faculty. A necessary faculty is so constituted that when all prerequisites for operation, both extrinsic and intrinsic, are present, it cannot but put forth the action. The prerequisites, therefore, not only make it a complete and adequate cause, but also inevitably determine it, so as to leave no possibility for it to abstain from action. Faculties of this kind are, undoubtedly, our understanding, our senses and our vegetative powers. A self-determining faculty, on the contrary, is constituted by the prerequisites a complete cause fully enabled to operate, but is not determined by them, so that in their very presence it may put forth and may withhold the action. It is, therefore, left in a state of indifference with regard to operation, an indifference, however, which is not passive, consisting in the susceptibility for further influences that may stimulate and determine it, but active, implying the power of determining on either alternative, either action or its omission. For such power must necessarily be conceived to be inherent in an agent that is fully able to elicit an action and also to withhold it; were it absent, the agent would be involved in the sheer impossibility to act. It is in this sense only that capability of self-determination must be understood. Consequently the freedom of the will is correctly defined as an endowment, by virtue of which the will, when all conditions prerequisite to elicit a volition are present, is enabled either to put forth or to abstain from that volition.<sup>2</sup> The same idea is expressed by St. Thomas<sup>3</sup> and the ancient school in general, when they define freedom as the mastery which the will has over its acts, because it is able to elicit or to abstain from them.

Now, is there any incongruity in the idea of free-will so defined, or is there any intrinsic contradiction in the conception of a cause or faculty which, when all conditions prerequisite for action are fulfilled, is able to act and also to abstain from acting? Where is

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. M. Maher, "Psychology," p. 395. <sup>3</sup> *Summa c. gent.* lib. I., cp. 68; S. th., P. I., qu. 82, art. 1, ad. 3.

the possibility of a contradiction, or of what nature should it be? A contradiction would be involved if freedom were to mean the presence and at the same time the absence also of a power to produce an effect, or the capability of simultaneously acting and not acting. But neither is meant. Freedom implies the capability of acting and the capability of abstaining from action, both capabilities simultaneously existing in the same faculty, but not simultaneously exercisable.

Nor is a free action an effect without a cause or a negation of the principle of causation, of law, order and uniformity. There is, indeed, a cause, and a fully sufficient cause of an action freely elicited. It is the will itself taken together with all the prerequisites of action. The prerequisites comprise among other things the knowledge of the act to be put forth and its object, its goodness or its badness, its advantages and disadvantages, all which constitute the motive of volition; they comprise also the inclination, disposition and energy of the will-power necessary for a given exertion. Free-will is in the presence of such prerequisites as sufficient a cause of the action which it performs as the necessary agent is of the effect it produces; nay, free-will is a cause incomparably more perfect, being able to act by its own determination and having full mastery over its actions.

Nor is it, therefore, necessary to conceive the free action as exempt from law, order and uniformity, and on that account inconsistent with the principle of causality. Free-will, though it acts by its own determination, does not and cannot determine itself but in accordance with its own nature. Its actions, therefore, are subject to the laws of rational nature, which are in part physical, in part moral, and conforming to them they make up the grandest and sublimest order, infinitely more attractive than all the beauties of the material universe. Besides, there is no impossibility in the fact that the will, though acting free and unconstrained, determines itself uniformly. In reality by uniform action habits and character are formed, and these once confirmed, uniformity consistent with self-determination increases. Several free agents may also follow the same line of conduct, acting in a similar manner under similar circumstances. For men, quite conformably with their nature, usually do not take to such actions as cannot be performed but with difficulty and extraordinary exertion, and, *vice versa*, do not abstain from such as are highly agreeable or advantageous either for the moment or the near future. Under these conditions, therefore, there will arise uniformity also in human conduct. It will, however, never be perfect, since there will always be numerous exceptions. Nor will it exclude self-determination; for also when the difficulty, or, on the contrary, the pleasurable-ness, of an action is unusually

great, we still are fully conscious that we could make greater efforts and, by making them, renounce an enticing pleasure or endure a very disagreeable hardship.

But even if free actions had no uniformity whatever, they would not on that account be contradictory to the principle of causality. Causation and succession are not identical, as materialistic philosophers maintain. The former implies a positive influence of the antecedent on the consequent, the latter does not. There is causation where there is no succession, as was the case when the first effect was produced; and there is succession where there is no causation, as between day and night. Nor does the principle of causality coincide with uniformity of succession. The necessity of causation is implied in the very nature of a finite being, or a thing that comes into existence out of non-existence, and, therefore, transcends all experience. It is an absolutely necessary truth known *a priori*, so universal as to hold true of all events and phenomena taken singly and collectively, whether succeeding one another or standing apart. The uniformity of phenomena, on the contrary, is a contingent fact, changeable and reversible, proved inductively from experience and hence admissible so far only as our experimental knowledge reaches in every particular province of nature. Consequently it is an utter confusion of thought to assert that the absence of uniformity in succession is the subversion of the principle of causality, which means that every effect must have its sufficient cause.

Since, then, none of the objections raised against the possibility of a free, self-determining faculty is tenable, none of the contradictions which materialists have tried to point out in it is real and none can be shown to be intrinsic to it, its conception must be regarded as logically sound and consistent.

### III.

This being established as a certain truth, the question follows, whether in fact the will is or is not endowed with the capability of self-determination. The proofs advanced for and against are in part *a priori*, that is, taken from previously adopted theories, in part *a posteriori*, that is, derived from experience either directly or indirectly.

As *a priori* reasons the determinists advance the supremacy of matter, the indeterminists, as the defenders of freedom are called, the spirituality of the soul. It must undoubtedly be granted that, on the ground of materialistic positions, the freedom of the will cannot stand. Matter, whether organic or inorganic, cannot act but

with necessity and according to necessary laws. A stone does not fall by self-determination, a hungry beast cannot but desire and grasp the food presented to it. If, as the monistic and agnostic theories hold, each psychic phenomenon is inevitably predetermined by its antecedent, and all follow one another in unchangeable uniformity; if the mind is one and the same thing with the body and matter the source of all forces: then, indeed, there is no will-power which, left undetermined by character and motives, acts by self-determination, or remains indifferent as to operation, when all prerequisites are present. It were folly to hold the freedom of will on materialistic premises; it were futile to attempt the arraignment of determinism on the strength of agnostic or monistic principles.

As determinism naturally springs from the supremacy of matter, so the freedom of the will necessarily follows from the spirituality of the soul. That the latter is no mere fiction we shall presently prove. A spirit is a substance neither made of matter nor having the properties of matter, such as extension or inertia, nor intrinsically dependent on matter, or what comes to the same, a spirit is a simple substance elevated above and independent of matter. As the nature of a thing and its activities are always in strict proportion, the cognitive faculty of the spirit, the intellect, apprehends its objects from an immaterial point of view, and hence represents them under the aspect of being. But being comprises all, the existing and the possible, the nature and essence of things as well as their phenomena, causes no less than effects. Thus the spirit is made for knowledge of unlimited extent; it is able to know all things, if not perfectly and directly, at least imperfectly and indirectly, and to know them both in themselves and in their mutual relations, their intrinsic constitution and their actions and appearances, their causes and their principles, proximate and ultimate. It is, moreover, equipped for the performance of manifold operations, for intuition and reasoning, for direct experience of outer things and reflection upon itself. Consequently it perceives not only its own operations, but also its own self as their subject, the *ego*, and not only the existence, but also the nature of the *ego* and the end and goal of its tendencies and aspirations. Recognizing happiness, the possession of the highest good, as such an end, the intellect finds out the object in which it is to be enjoyed and the ways in which it is to be reached. For it apprehends good as such, the very nature of goodness, measures the amount of good that is in all particular things and inquires into the relationship which they bear to the supreme good.

To the unlimited scope of the intellect corresponds the extent of the power of the will. For it stands to reason that whatever nature is endowed with the faculty of knowing good must be supplemented

by the faculty of pursuing it. Therefore the will must be conceived as an inclination to the good as apprehended by the mind. Being such, the will is able to incline to all objects perceived as good, to desire them under that aspect of good, under which they are conceived, and to love them in proportion to the good which they are understood to have. Now the human mind knows all good, finite and infinite, reaches the nature of goodness, and attributes to diverse things a diverse value and degree of goodness. Accordingly, the will also inclines to good as such and is able to desire all good in so much that it cannot rest until it has attained the very fulness of good; yet it pursues its objects with unequal regard and affection. These plain and simple statements borne in mind, it is easily understood that the will desires happiness with irresistible necessity, and all other objects not necessary for happiness, with freedom and indifference. Happiness, which means the possession of all good and immunity from all evil, cannot but be desired by a faculty whose nature consists in the inclination to good as such or to good in general. The mere possibility of the contrary would involve an intrinsic contradiction in the will; because it would mean an innate inclination and at the same time indifference to good, an innate necessity to love good and the simultaneous capability to hate or reject what contains nothing but good, nay, what is goodness itself. Again, the mind, far from representing happiness as an object of indifference, apprehends it by reason of its pure goodness as absolutely desirable, apprehends it as a conditionless necessity and as such that with it the ultimate goal of all objects and desires is reached, but without it no rest and abiding satisfaction is possible.

Objects, on the other hand, which neither cause happiness nor are necessarily connected with its attainment, are of a widely different nature. The good in them is mixed with evil. Hence they are not commensurate with the power of the will, consisting in the inclination to good as such and tending to the fulness of good, and cannot attract it irresistibly. They are such as may move the will and may leave it unmoved, as may move it to love and desire or to hatred and aversion; to love and desire, because they contain some degree of goodness, to hatred and aversion, because they also contain some evil or absence of good. Thus regarding these objects, the will is under no necessity, it has but the mere capability of desiring and of not desiring, of loving and of hating; even when attracted by them, it is not constrained, but enabled only to pursue them, thus remaining in a state of indifference and indeterminateness.

Reason presents such objects to the will also as indifferent to, not necessary of pursuit. Everybody conceives happiness as an object necessarily to be pursued. But things without which happiness can

be obtained, which conduce to it, but are not the sole means that render its attainment possible, are not apprehended as necessary goods, as when many roads lead to a city, none of them in particular is thought to be of indispensable necessity. Goods, therefore, of this kind are represented by the mind as objects which may be desired, because they contribute to happiness, and may not be desired, because happiness can be had without them. To speak in still wider terms, whatever is not good in every regard, or what is not the fullness of good, is conceived by the mind as indifferent to appetite; for what is such is apprehended as desirable for the good that is in it, and as not desirable by reason of the absence of good from it. If the will, then, in accordance with its nature, desires its objects in the manner in which they are known to be desirable, and loves them in proportion to the goodness they are judged to have, it, indeed, pursues happiness with necessity, and, whatever is not necessary for happiness, with indifference.

Nor is this indifference of the will interfered with, when among several goods presented one is preferable to the other. For the greater good, even compared with a lesser, retains its deficiency and imperfection, and the lesser in presence of the greater retains its goodness. Wherefore, as the former, notwithstanding its superiority, may be declined or rejected, so the latter, notwithstanding its inferiority, yet remains worthy of love and desire. Hence both of them leave the will in its indifference.

Careful examination, then, shows that in the will of the spiritual soul there are all attributes necessary to render it free. It is a faculty which at the representation of a good not necessarily connected with happiness is fully able to desire and pursue it, and yet may abstain from its desire and pursuit; a faculty which in the presence of all prerequisites for action, under the influence of its own propensities and habits, and of all external motives and circumstances, may put forth the action of volition or may withhold it; a faculty which is left undetermined and indifferent by its own nature and by the object presented to it, yet, because able to act and to abstain from acting, possesses the power also of determining on either alternative and so is endowed with the capability of self-determination.

If, as we have shown thus far, indeterminism follows from the spirituality of the soul with the same logical necessity as determinism follows from the supremacy of matter, the merits of the two theories depend entirely on the truth or falsehood of the materialistic view. Space does not allow us here to enter upon a critical examination of materialism, nor is it necessary after so many learned essays and most competent works have been written on this subject. On the one hand, the most prominent thinkers of mankind down to our

day, to prove the spirituality of the soul, have advanced not only numerous but also most ingenious and convincing reasons, and reasons which our modern materialists have not yet disproved, nay, not even touched upon, utterly unacquainted as they are with the writings and the thoughts of Christian philosophy. On the other hand, no conclusive proof has thus far been proffered for materialism by its votaries. The boldest of them treat us in their scientific works to hypotheses and conjectures about the nature of psychic processes, while those of deeper learning and greater modesty openly confess their incompetency to explain, how thought can be the function of an organism. It is only an expressed hope that in ages yet to come more advanced science may succeed in satisfactorily proving the identity of mind and body; but even this hope is not entertained by all.<sup>4</sup> The main prop of modern materialism is the impossibility which its adherents profess to experience in conceiving things spiritual and supersensible. Such objects, they tell us, are unthinkable, because on mature reflection our mind discovers nought in them but abstractions, fictions, a conglomerate of intrinsic contradictions.

It is, indeed, astonishing that the ideas of supersensible objects, examined, perfected and developed by the greatest minds of the former ages and made the corner-stone of philosophy and of all moral life, have on a sudden turned out to be inconceivable, an intrinsic absurdity. Were questions involved whose solution depended on scientific researches or close observation by improved instruments, such a sudden change of opinion might be understood. But here we deal with a subject which is grasped only by thought and mental analysis and is at the same time of paramount interest to the human mind in all ages. Wherefore the ancient no less than the modern thinkers were able to grasp them and prompted to inquire into their nature. It is all the more astonishing that materialists brand the spiritual as intrinsically contradictory, notwithstanding all the explanations so often given by the most learned authors, because whilst so doing they are not at all shocked at the glaring contradictions necessarily consequent on the denial of a supramundane Deity and a spiritual soul. For if the personal Deity is done away with, and matter is enthroned in its place, an ultimate and supreme cause is admitted, which is infinite, self-existent, absolutely necessary and eternal, and at the same time finite and changeable in its existence and activity, which is the source of all real perfections, and yet is most imperfect in itself; which is the last foundation of all real things, and yet is only an abstraction and generalization of the mind, the cause of all order, all adaptation to ends, all beauty in the universe, and yet works merely mechanically. If a soul distinct from

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. T. Ladd, "Elements of Physiological Psychology," Part III., ch. i., sec. 7-9.

the bodily organism is denied, mind and body are maintained to be one and the self-same real thing, and yet it is asserted that psychic and physical phenomena arising from one and the self-same thing have nothing in common, nay, that there is between mind and body a difference transcending all differences. By the denial of a real metaphysical order, on the ground that there is no cognitive faculty in us to reach it, the objective truth of universal and necessary principles is destroyed, and yet constantly presupposed as a reality in scientific conclusions; the outward world perceived by the senses is converted into subjective phenomena, which have but a deceptive appearance of external objects, and yet they are represented as the only solid reality. All these positions, though manifestly contradictory in themselves, are held by the materialists as primary principles so completely self-evident that denial of them must be stigmatized as utter folly. In truth, they strain out gnats and swallow camels. Their method is to presuppose the theistic doctrine as absurd, nay, as the climax of absurdity, in spite of all reasons advanced for it, to assume in consequence the materialistic view as true and certain, though, far from being corroborated by conclusive proofs, it is condemned by its self-contradictions as thoroughly unreasonable. To sum up, the spirituality of the soul, which is the ultimate origin of free-will, as yet holds its ground, vindicated as it is by irrefragable proofs; the materialistic position, the basis of determinism, not resting on experience and being repugnant to reason, has no claim, whatever to truth.

#### IV.

Still whatever the *a priori* proofs advanced for or against our capability of self-determination be, free-will is asserted as a fact, and facts are proved as conclusive mainly from experience. This is most willingly granted by materialists. Free-will is an internal fact, and must, therefore, be attested by consciousness. Now what do we learn regarding it from internal experience? Two things are beyond all doubt manifested by introspection as a matter of fact: first, that we ourselves guide the course of our thoughts, and, in a special manner, our attention to motives and incitements to action, and secondly, that we ourselves determine what motives are to prevail and to what propensities we are to yield.

Our attention to motives offered is not predetermined. We may take them into consideration, or may direct our thought to some other object. And, if we prefer to deliberate on them, we examine their respective value as we think fit, pondering what is against or in favor of each, or we direct our attention to the one rather than the other, to this aspect of goodness rather than to that. Our attention,

therefore, and reflection are an exercise of free causal energy put forth by ourselves.

When the deliberation is completed we are not yet determined to act or not to act; the decision depends upon ourselves. Daily experience shows that whenever there is a motive for an action on the one hand, and a motive to abstain from it on the other, we have the choice of the alternative, and that, however strongly a habit or a propensity prompts us to pursue or to relinquish a given object, we can resist the inclination. However great the advantages following on a certain line of conduct, and however great the pleasure attending a pursuit in prospect, we are conscious that we can decline the course of action opened to us, because of some evil inseparable from it. Likewise, knowing that some enjoyment or indulgence to which we are prompted is contrary to the dictates of reason, we can and often do renounce it, notwithstanding the repugnance we may feel in obeying the higher law, and notwithstanding the inclination we experience to yield to the lower appetite. If we yield to the stronger impulse, we are fully conscious that we do so under no compulsion, but by our own decision. In all such cases the motives do not inevitably determine us, but we determine ourselves as to what motives we are to follow.

After making a resolve to perform an action, to renounce a pleasure or to overcome a difficulty, we are still conscious that at any moment we can rescind our resolution and follow a different course. Nay, the perseverance necessary in carrying out a resolution requires the greatest effort on our part and frequently entails even a heroic, painful and long struggle. Who will say, then, that it is not the outcome of our own determination, but of acquired habits or momentary impressions and attractions? Thus it is our own will that by its decision starts and directs deliberation on motives, prefers one motive to the other, though oftener the stronger to the weaker, yet sometimes the weaker to the stronger, and in this way chooses the object it is to pursue, the action it is to perform, and, the choice being made, perseveres in the execution of its own resolution struggling with contrary impulses from within and from without.

That such is our consciousness and such the conclusions that must be inferred from its testimony, Professor Sidgwick, though one of the chief defenders of determinism, openly confesses.

"Certainly," says he, "in the case of actions in which I have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right and reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive, however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclination in the past."

That, moreover, such conviction engendered by consciousness is most firm, he very appropriately declares in the following words:

"It is simply impossible for me to think at such a moment that my volition is completely determined by my formed character and motives acting on it. The opposite conviction is so strong as to be absolutely unshaken by the evidence brought against it; I cannot believe it to be illusory. So far it is unlike the erroneous intuitions which occur in the exercise of the senses, as (*e. g.*) the imperfections of sight and hearing. For experience soon teaches me to regard these as appearances whose suggestions are misleading; but no amount of experience of the sway of motives even tends to make me distrust my intuitive consciousness that in resolving after deliberation I exercise free choice as to which of the motives acting on me shall prevail."<sup>5</sup>

If consciousness, then, bears witness to our free choice in numberless cases, are we not in accordance with all the rules of logic entitled to maintain free-will as a matter beyond all doubt? The determinists are at hand with an exception against the conclusion. As to freedom of will, they object, consciousness gives no evidence, because by introspection we know the existence only of our actions, not their causes; nay, it is positively false and deceptive, because, reflecting on ourselves, we confound the ignorance of the motive that determines us with the absence of any determining motive, or take the mere logical possibility of an action for its physical and complete possibility. Yet neither the one nor the other objection is sustained by the reasons alleged. By introspection we know our actions not in general and abstractly, but individually and concretely as they exist in us and proceed from our faculties. But the manner in which a free action proceeds from the will is quite different from that in which a necessary action proceeds from it. Hence we unmistakably can and do discern necessary from free actions, perceiving either the constraint, under which we act, or the absence of it, the necessity which prevents us from acting otherwise or the indifference which renders us capable of acting or not acting. Of all this we are not less distinctly conscious than we are of the difficulty or ease with which we put forth our actions. The other reason advanced against the trustworthiness of our consciousness is just as untenable. Ignorance of the determinate motive which actually necessitates us and absence of motives which determine us are things so plainly different that it is not possible to mistake the one for the other. Nay, we are most distinctly conscious of active indifference or self-determination just when we have pondered the motives

<sup>5</sup> "Methods of Ethics," Bk. I., c. v., sec. 2, first edition, quoted by M. Maher, "Psychology," p. 367, first edition. On the testimony of consciousness cf. also C. Gutberlet, "Die Willensfreiheit," pp. 30, 237, 256.

present to us and fully understood their full relative value; for it is then that they are perceived as not free from evil and consequently apprehended as not determining us, but as leaving the determination to ourselves. Finally, who in the world has ever after attentive reflection confounded logical with physical possibility, that is, an action merely conceived as possible, with an action really and actually possible under given circumstances? Indeed, when we strongly incline to a pleasure offered or an act of revenge, and a favorable occasion being at hand, yet resist the impulse and abstain from it as unlawful, or when we make the utmost effort to achieve an end, we perceive enjoyment, revenge, rest, freedom from labor and sacrifice not merely absolutely possible, but as easier and more attractive.

There is still another and more serious side to the exception which determinists make to internal experience. According to empiricists, and determinists usually belong to this class of philosophers, consciousness is the criterion of all certainty, because in their opinion the direct and immediate object of our experience and of cognition in general are our subjective affections. In any case consciousness is a necessary condition of certitude, inasmuch as it must reveal, besides the primary fact of our own existence, also the perception of the motive necessary for assent. But if what has been adopted as a criterion of truth or what must be considered as a necessary condition of firm and certain conviction, is, by its very nature, deceptive and unreliable, certitude is impossible and universal skepticism is the necessary consequence. Moreover, if the testimony of consciousness to the existence of free-will is false and deceptive, then a conviction hitherto necessary and unshaken, found among all men and in all ages, is untrue, the reason of its untruth lying in no external illusion, but in the deficiency of human nature. If so, the rational nature of man can no longer be said to have been made for the knowledge of truth; for it would adhere to truth and falsehood with equal firmness and would by its intrinsic constitution and with irresistible force lead men to wrong convictions. Such unfitness for the attaining of truth must be all the more intrinsic to reason, as interior facts, being nearest to the mind and striking it directly, require no special reasoning, but are knowable by intuition. If the mind cannot reach such objects, if apprehending them it errs and produces false perceptions and convictions, what truth is it still able to attain?

Finally, if the will is not free, as our consciousness tells us it is, all opinions ever held by men spring from the human mind with necessity, being as it were the necessary outcome of its nature. But those opinions, whether they be the teachings of philosophers or conclusions arrived at by scientists, are contradictory and utterly irreconcilable; they are, consequently, not all true, but are, in part

at least, false, and many of them are evidently absurd. Rational nature, then, is the necessary source of all errors that ever existed; it constantly contradicts itself and unavoidably leads to absurdities. This conclusion follows with more striking evidence from the evolutionary theory admitted by most determinists. Human reason in the course of its necessary development from stage to stage forms views and convictions which though conducive to the progress of mankind, still prove false in the succeeding higher grades of civilization. Thus in primitive ages gross idolatry and polytheism prevailed. Later they yielded to theistic and Christian ideas, which contributed so much to progress and enlightenment. But these are nowadays, as we are told, antiquated and have given way to more advanced philosophy. And so, too, this latest phase of thought will fade away in the light of broader views, and is even now constantly changing and transforming. Accordingly, reason is by its very nature the source and mainspring of continuous errors, in so much that all its views and tenets, though first adopted as necessary truths, always prove false and will in all succeeding ages prove to be so; it is always searching for truth and always fancying to have reached it, yet never able to grasp it, but doomed to grope in darkness and error during all periods of human existence. Being such, is human reason yet trustworthy? Can its principles and conclusions still have any claim to credence and reliability? Is its light and evidence yet a motive for firm assent?

A theory that thus refuses to admit the testimony of consciousness as a proof for the existence of free-will ultimately terminates in universal skepticism, in the doubt about all views and positions ever held by philosophers. To seek to be rid of a well attested fact, contrary to an adopted theory, by calling it an illusion, is always dangerous and illogical, but in the present case it is simply suicidal, because the denial of the fact overturns the very theory which it is intended to uphold.

Considerations like these lead to the conclusion that experience, which is regarded by the determinists as the main source of knowledge and as the chief criterion of truth, establishes the existence of free-will beyond all doubt, grounding a conviction in us which cannot be overthrown without shattering the foundations of certitude. This might be a sufficient defense of freedom against determinism. Still, to search the matter deeper, let us advance further proofs taken from undeniable facts admitted also by modern thinkers.

## V.

The moral and the social order no less than physical laws and phenomena are granted to be real existences, clearly manifested

throughout the history of mankind, and are universally considered to be of such importance that there neither is nor ever has been any system of philosophy which was not concerned with them and has not sought to give them support. Now in both these orders the freedom of will is implied as an essential constituent. Consequently, their reality granted, free-will must be admitted and cannot be denied without self-contradiction.

To prove this assertion an analysis of the moral order is necessary. What is peculiar to it so as to distinguish it from any other sphere or order? Obligation, accountability, virtue and vice, merit and demerit, retribution by reward and punishment. Let us begin with obligation. There are physical and moral laws. Physical laws establish a necessity which it is simply impossible to resist. Moral laws lay the rational will under a necessity which it is not impossible to resist, yet which to disobey is sin. It is this latter kind of necessity that is called a moral obligation and which we express by the words *we ought*. Though liable to be disobeyed, still it is conceived as inflexible and absolute, imposed on us ultimately by the highest power; wherefore no finite or created being can abolish it or exempt itself from it. Disobedience to it is the greatest of all disorders, not merely a folly, but a wrong, a sin and iniquity, attended by remorse and to be atoned for by the greatest penalties; whereas obedience to it is at once and with the fullest evidence understood to be an act of virtue deserving supreme reward. Not only has the necessity peculiar to moral obligation always been so conceived and explained in philosophical and theological schools, but it is felt to be such by the simple and unlettered as well as by the learned, by the wicked as well as by the virtuous.

Now does not obligation so defined necessarily suppose the freedom of will? It implies the perfect possibility of complying with it on the part of the will; for, indeed, absolute necessity of doing what is impossible is a pure absurdity; and it involves besides a no less complete and unimpeded possibility of not complying with it; for its violation is but too frequently an undeniable fact. But the possibility of doing a thing and of not doing it, of observing a law and of transgressing it in the presence of all prerequisites, is evidently the capability of the will to perform a given act and to omit it; a capability which was shown above to imply the power of choosing and of self-determination.

Furthermore, why is it that obedience to a law binding on our conscience is held to be an act of virtue and therefore praiseworthy, and why is the transgression of it considered as a sin and consequently blameworthy? Conformity with law constitutes order both in the physical and in the moral world. But never as yet has an

action conformable to physical laws, as for instance the fall of a stone, the flowing of a river to the ocean or the growth of a tree, been termed a virtue. Nor are those actions of rational beings which are performed with physical necessity, such as the assent of the intellect to a self-evident truth, called morally good, however perfect and well ordered they may be. Only the operations of the will conformable to the moral law are termed virtuous, and those, on the contrary, disagreeing with it, sinful. It is so in the languages of all nations. Whence this difference between the conformity of the will with the moral, and that of other forces with the physical law? And what is it that gives obedience to a moral law its special worth, raising it so high above conformity with any other law or order? There is only one answer possible. Obedience of our faculties to physical law is altogether the outcome of their nature and of external causes working on them. But obedience to the moral law, which is the right order of human conduct, is not predetermined by the nature and inclination of our faculties and the influence of the object proposed to them; no, it is the choice of our will, which has in its power the alternative to obey and to disobey, and which left unconstrained and undetermined, acts by its own decision. It is this that stamps upon the observance of the moral law its proper worth and dignity and gives it the value of virtue, while, on the other hand, it makes acts of disobedience to it sinful and constitutes their intrinsic baseness, which we all deem the greatest of all disorders. Evidently, then, the very conception of moral law and obligation imports free-will.

Further examination serves but to confirm this conclusion. A morally bad action causes remorse, a morally good one peace and approval of conscience. We do not feel remorse for actions, however injurious, which we have done through natural necessity or indeliberation, as for instance a misstep which caused a broken leg, or an involuntary want of foresight whereby we contracted a disease; nay, we could not even blame ourselves for such actions, since nature itself or attending circumstances forced them on us. We can reprove ourselves only when the evil act was brought about by our own determination, it being in our power to avoid it and to act differently. Likewise, there is reason for self-approbation, not when we have performed a well ordered or beneficent action unwittingly or under compulsion, but when we did it by our own choice. Nor is it our own conscience alone that rebukes and approves; the whole of mankind assigns blame to morally bad actions and to them alone, and praise to morally good actions and to these exclusively. Whatever acts of cruelty a wild beast may have done, we do not blame it for them, nor do we consider the murder committed by a

madman a guilt, nor do we, on the other hand, praise the gentle or useful actions of brutes as good and virtuous. Yet if a man, as for instance the assassin of our late President McKinley, commits murder, we abhor and detest the act as a crime and regard the doer as culpable. And when we see a man deliberately perform a good deed, as for instance an act of mercy, charity, forgiveness, devotedness to public welfare, we praise and honor him and bless his memory. Clearly actions of the former kind we do not deem worthy of praise or blame, because we are aware that they are not free, not determined by the agent himself, but by natural forces, not the outcome of his own will and decision, but of his nature and of circumstances. But on the latter kind of action we bestow praise or blame, because we conceive them as man's own deeds, coming from his determination and from his choice. And the more clearly the act is understood to be free and deliberate, resulting from man's own decision and not from overpowering influences, the more we blame it, if evil, or praise and admire it, if good. It is according to this standard that both in private and in public life murder or assault is judged and condemned and discharge of duty or acts of self-sacrifice are extolled and commended.

Moral actions have still another attribute of even higher importance. Not only do we blame ourselves for the transgression of a moral law, but we feel ourselves also responsible for it to the supreme authority which enacts and upholds moral obligation. But there is no consciousness of accountability in us for any such actions as are necessary or subject to physical laws, as for instance for the circulation of the blood, the digestion of the stomach, the growth of the body, the inability to understand a mathematical problem. Nor has ever any living being been called to account for them. Thus far horses, dogs and madmen have not yet been summoned to our courts to be accused of misdemeanors. For such are imputed to free men only. The very idea of accountability for necessary actions is absurd. Their performance or omission not being in our power, we are not masters of them, and they consequently cannot be imputed to us, but are ascribed to the causes which necessitated us. We can be accountable only for acts which are ours truly and in a strict sense, which depended on our own determination, to which no cause has constrained us, but which we ourselves chose rather to do than not to do. In short, responsibility is conceivable only for free actions.

He to whom we are accountable, be it the divine or the human judge, be it he whose judgment seat is in our own conscience or he who sits in an earthly court, pronounces our actions as being of good or ill desert and subject to retribution. Merit entitles us to an equivalent which is to be given for the good we have done in

behalf of others, as demerit requires the privation of a good equivalent to the evil we have done. Merit, therefore, and demerit imply the necessity of just retribution, which, when paid by authority, consists in proportionate rewards for good and in punishments for evil deeds. Moral actions have the highest merit and demerit and require retribution on the highest scale; for virtue and vice are the observance and violation of the supreme and most important order, and, therefore, we predicate the one the greatest of all goods attainable in this life and the other the greatest of all evils. Hence the fullest reward and punishment, reward consisting in the enjoyment of endless happiness, punishment consisting in utter loss and affliction, are hoped for or feared as most certain to be dealt out for them by the supreme and universal judge.

But, again, an action that is not free cannot possibly contract any merit or demerit, so as to be subject to retribution and especially to retribution of so grave a nature. No man can in justice require any reward or be subjected to punishment for an act which is not really his and which cannot be imputed to him. Reason, so far from demanding retribution of us in the shape of either reward or punishment for actions not our own, condemns it as a perversity and as the grossest injustice. When and where have human courts ever acted on a different principle? But an action is really ours only when it is free, that is, when it proceeds, not from any necessity, internal or external to us, as nature, character or circumstances, but from our choice and determination. It cannot be objected that we formed our character by our own preceding actions, and that therefore the present action that necessarily results from it is really and strictly ours. For our preceding actions were not free either. Before the character was formed they were the necessary outcome of the nature that was given to us and of external influence. Necessity of retribution, therefore, which is regarded as intrinsic to moral actions, is in the absence of free-will a perversion of justice, a contradiction to all principles of reason. And so it is with all other constituents and attributes of the moral order, with law and obligation, goodness and badness, virtue and vice, imputability and accountability; they become intrinsic contradictions the moment that self-determination or freedom is denied.

Consistently with determinism, then, there can be no moral order distinct from the material and physical order. Determinists may or may not draw this conclusion. If they shrink from it, they must renounce their theory; if they do not, they must put into the world a new kind of morality based on laws merely physical and organic. This latter alternative has, in fact, been adopted by many modern teachers of moral science. But with what consequences? Their

teachings degrade man to brute matter, blot out whatever is sublime, exalted and holy in his moral conduct, deny his destination for a higher end to be reached and enjoyed in a life of happiness to come, mock at his natural longing for immortality with all its concomitant pure and spiritual aspirations, seek to mar the conception of virtue and moral goodness, do away with the sacred motives inducing to perfect and holy actions, and abolish the absolute obligation of the moral law enjoining the observance of the right order, which is enacted by a supreme and irresistible power and urged by just and severe sanction.

Moreover, they forget that it is impossible to look on the ethical convictions of men since the spread of Christianity as mere fictions or errors. These are convictions that have struck the deepest roots in the human heart, so deep, in fact, that they have subdued the most vehement passions, overcome the fiercest attacks and withstood the exterminating influence of adverse philosophy. They have regenerated human society, changed the habits of mankind, corrected inveterate vices, inculcated the sublimest virtues, inspired the purest sentiments, given strength for the greatest sacrifices. Agnostic and positive philosophy does not deny these facts, but is compelled to grant that the moral belief fostered by the Christian religion has raised mankind to higher civilization, nay, was necessary to its enlightenment, improvement and progress. Convictions so deep, so strong, so universal, productive of so sublime virtues cannot be false and absurd; for absurdities cannot take a fast and stubborn hold on human reason, cannot produce goodness and perfection or be necessary for the rise and advancement of right conduct. The moral order as embodied in Christian ethics is not a deceitful fiction, but a genuine reality that has shed light, displayed wonderful beauty and effected the well-being of society in the course of many centuries.<sup>6</sup>

The moral order, then, being a reality, is an irrefragable proof for the existence of free-will. The social order is an argument no less convincing. It is essential to human society to be based on justice, on rights and obligations. By this characteristic feature it is distinguished from the physical universe, and especially from the aggregations we find in the animal kingdom. Thus far laws have not been enacted for brutes living in herds, flocks or hives; nor have they been deemed necessary, because animals are led by instincts, which are obeyed necessarily; or even possible, because they are beyond the reach of sensuous cognition. It is only of late that rights have been attributed to animals by certain writers. Courts and Legislatures, however, have thus far not recognized them. Did they in fact exist, certainly the first of them would be the right to

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. M. Maher, "Psychology," fourth edition, pp. 398-406.

life and existence. But then killing and eating animals would be a crime no less than anthropophagy, and men and women of the most highly civilized and cultured classes would have to be looked on as cannibals. What is no less astonishing, these kind-hearted friends of the brute creation, so intent on the codification of animal rights, which man should regard, know in the absence of animal laws of no human rights which brutes should respect. If things are carried on in this line, it is to be feared that we shall soon be left to the mercy of wild beasts, poisonous snakes and pest-breeding insects.

Society, which is a union of persons harmoniously pursuing the same end, needs a norm by conformity to which harmony of action is established, and a bond whereby unity is effected and maintained. It is authority that gives existence both to the one and to the other by the enactment of laws, which create duties and rights. No state, no society could as yet exist without an authority endowed with law-making power. But laws, duties and rights presuppose free-will in man. Law, as far as it creates duties, imposes obligations which do not constrain us physically, because they can be disregarded, but constitute a moral necessity. For their binding power is independent of external circumstances, as well as of personal character or propensity, and, whilst it is just as possible to infringe as to observe them, they are always sacred, so much so that disregard of them is incurrance of guilt, an offense not only against the civil authority that enacted them, but also against the supreme ruler who is the author of society. In a word, the necessity and obligation of law is moral, and its observance or transgression is morally good or bad and subject to retribution by the supreme judge. Consequently it implies freedom of the will as the moral order in general does. Moreover, laws are enacted and imposed on man, and on man alone, just for the reason that he is thought to be free in his actions, able to determine his conduct by his own choice. Only free, self-determining beings require a norm and restraining rule; other creatures are not in need of it, because they are irresistibly necessitated by their nature or by external causes. For the same reason also that man is supposed to be master of his actions and not predetermined to them, he is called to account for the transgression of laws by human courts and punished according to justice. For accountability and retribution, as was shown above, are not conceivable but for free actions. By the very supposition, therefore, that there is no free-will in man, all our laws at once become unreasonable, our law-givers fools, our judges, when they punish criminals, perpetrators of gross injustice, and our whole civilization, in which we glory so much, an absurdity.

Laws enacted by authority also create rights to protect the mem-

bers of society and to secure for them their due share in the common good achieved by united social action. Rights created like duties presuppose the freedom of human will, from whatever point of view they may be considered. On the part of him who possesses it, a right is not a physical power to exercise compulsion, else the weaker ones, the children, the sick and in general the helpless would be deprived of rights, and oppressing or killing them would be no injustice; nor is it a force acting with necessity, for we make use of it as we please. Rights are therefore of a moral nature. On the part of him who has to respect them in others and to yield to their demands, they mean no physical necessity either, no compulsion exercised, since they are often trampled on; they consequently impose on him only a moral necessity, an obligation. This is understood also from the fact that he who has violated the lawful rights of others is considered guilty of a moral transgression, held accountable for his misdeed and subject to retribution, whereas he who is regardful of his fellow-men's rights is praised as good and virtuous. Thus rights belong to the moral order, in which freedom of will is implied as an essential constituent.

If we consider the end for which rights are conferred either by the law of nature or by positive laws, it will be plain to us that they aim at the protection of freedom. Their object is to establish free scope for our actions, to keep aloof undue interference on the part of those with whom we live, to ensure not only our life and existence, but also the means necessary and useful to reach our earthly destination in the manner we deem fit and have determined for ourselves. Does not modern science claim to have brought about this happy state of things, when it so boastfully glories that, by the enlightened views it has spread and the laws it has advised, men have been redeemed from the bondage of feudal ages and restored to the liberty due to their nature? Is not this the end and purpose of the modern political institutions, forms of government and administration of justice, all of which are calculated, it is said, to establish equality among men, to guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the press, of religion, of trade and commerce, of government by the choice of the governed, and enactment of laws by the people or their representatives? Of course, the liberties thus secured are only external. But what does external liberty mean and aim at, if man has no power of choice and self-determination, if he is, like the things of brute creation, determined by his very nature or constrained by external influence? If man be such, what else is external liberty than a contradiction with his nature, an utter impossibility?

Perhaps, it is said, that through our modern institutions man has regained his freedom, inasmuch as he is no longer to be determined

from without, but by his own natural inclinations and acquired character. But it has already been remarked that, while we inherited nature from our parents and progenitors, our character was formed by our actions, which, if there be no free-will, are the necessary result of external influence. In this supposition the so-called external liberties would merely tend to preserve and consolidate contracted habits, and, consequently, to preclude progress and evolution in new directions. This, however, we are solemnly assured, is not the purpose of modern science and politics; ours is called an age of progress. We must therefore draw the conclusion that rights and social institutions, aiming at the guarantee and increase of external liberty in private and public life, presuppose the internal freedom of the will and are intended for its unimpeded exercise in the midst of the surroundings in which we are placed.

What must we in the face of this conclusion think of the double assertion mentioned in the beginning of our discussion, that, in our days, advanced science has done away with the fiction of free-will cherished in bygone times of darkness and ignorance, and has created true liberty after centuries of bondage? It is a plain self-contradiction, to which writers or speakers can commit themselves only when they neglect to ponder the meaning of the terms they employ, or utterly fail to understand the nature of social and political life and the end and purpose of civil society.

Evidently, then, free-will is involved in the social order, in its object, in its rights and corresponding duties, in its laws and institutions. It is involved no less necessarily in the moral order, in the conception of morality, of virtue and vice, of obligation, of accountability, of guilt, of merit and demerit, of retribution, reward and punishment according to human as well as divine justice.

Consequently it has real existence as truly as these two orders, the reality of which nobody dares deny, because they are too plainly revealed by the history of mankind and too deeply grounded in human nature. Free-will is, moreover, attested as an undeniable fact by our own consciousness so clearly, indeed, and so universally that nobody could as yet deny it without intricating himself in self-contradictions. Going beyond experience and tracing back free-will to its origin, we see it spring from the spirituality of the soul, from the unlimited scope of mind and will, from the power of the one to deliberate and the capability of the other to embrace or to reject any object presented to it which is not the fulness of all good, to embrace it on account of the good it contains and to reject it on account of the deficiency intrinsic to it. On the other hand, the determinists, to allege reasons for the denial of free-will, destroy everything that is great and elevated in human nature. They deny the spiritual nature

of the soul, thus to subject it to the necessary laws of matter, they disown the trustworthiness of consciousness, which testifies our self-determination, and thereby stultify human reason itself, they undermine and overturn both the moral and the social order, degrading man's directive principles to the level of mere instinct, his noblest deeds to necessary determinations arising from his organism and from external circumstances, his social life to gregariousness originated and controlled like that of brutes by sensitive sympathies.

Indeed the freedom of the human will is rooted on a solid foundation and is denied by a theory not only devoid of positive reason, but utterly destructive in its tendency. This is the final conclusion reached by our discussion.

When we opened our inquiry we saw old and new, Christian and anti-Christian philosophy, meet in a controversy of vital importance; the modern thinkers proud of their achievements, heaping disgrace on the ancient school, the latter scarcely allowed to utter a word in self-defense. Now after examination of the methods employed on both sides, after having weighed the proofs advanced and the results reached by either party, after having arrived at a well-grounded conclusion, some questions may well rise in the mind of many a reader. Which of the two schools aims at the real welfare of mankind? which upholds the true dignity of man and elevates the human race, promotes morality and consolidates society? which of the two secures rights and freedom to man, demands protection for him and allows his evolution in all directions? On which side is consistency, solid reasoning, careful analysis, unbiased inquiry? The answer cannot be doubtful. It is Christian philosophy alone that mankind may regard as the bulwark of its dignity, its freedom, its social peace and order. From anti-Christian thought it has to fear degradation, oppression, enslavement to matter. From the teachings of Christian philosophy, based in all its parts on reason and intelligence, issue enlightenment, spiritual knowledge, higher ideals, motives for exalted virtues; from anti-Christian theories, built merely on inductions from sensuous experience and on empiric knowledge, hostile to all that is supramundane and supersensible, follow laws of thought and conduct which forever bind the human mind and will down to the earth without the possibility of ever rising to the eternal truth or aspiring to the infinite good. If the divine saying, "*Veritas liberabit vos,*" may be taken as a criterion, then Christian, not materialistic thought, is true philosophy.

JOHN J. MING, S. J.

Prairie du Chien, Wis.